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THE NEW PROFESSIONAL PLAINTIFFS IN SHAREHOLDER 
LITIGATION 
Jessica Erickson* 
Abstract 
In 1995, Congress solved the problem of professional plaintiffs in 
shareholder litigation—or so it thought. The Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (PSLRA) was designed to end the influence of shareholder 
plaintiffs who had little or no connection to the underlying suit. Yet it may 
have failed to accomplish its goal. In the wake of the PSLRA, many 
professional plaintiffs simply moved into other types of corporate lawsuits. 
In shareholder derivative suits and acquisition class actions across the 
country, professional plaintiffs are back. They are repeat filers involved in 
dozens of lawsuits. They are the attorneys’ spouses, parents, and children. 
They may even be entities created for the primary purpose of filing 
litigation. These new professional plaintiffs have flown almost entirely 
under the radar of corporate law scholarship. This Article pulls back the 
curtain on professional plaintiffs, examining court filings and other public 
records in the first comprehensive study of professional plaintiffs’ role in 
corporate law. In most instances, professionalism is a good thing—but not 
when it comes to choosing plaintiffs.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1990s, corporate America claimed to be under siege by 
professional plaintiffs. Companies asserted that plaintiffs were filing 
securities class actions armed with little more than suspicion of bad 
business decisions.1 According to conventional lore, these plaintiffs 
worked in tandem with their attorneys, deliberately positioning themselves 
to file lawsuits by purchasing a few shares of stock in a large number of 
public companies.2 Investor groups joined in the chorus, arguing that these 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & 
Fin. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 216, 499–503 (1994) [hereinafter 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin.] (testimony of Stephen F. Smith, General 
Counsel and Dir. of Investor Relations, Exabyte Corporation); Common Sense Legal Reform Act: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
104th Cong. 39–42 (1995) (statement of James Kimsey, Chairman, America Online, Inc.). 
 2. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32–33 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (“Professional plaintiffs who 
2
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plaintiffs had little incentive to protect the interests of absent class 
members.3 The system was broken, and many critics placed the blame 
squarely with professional plaintiffs. 
In response, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (PSLRA).4 The PSLRA overhauled enforcement of the federal 
securities laws. It placed strict limits on the number of securities class 
actions that a single investor could file, and it prohibited investors from 
receiving payment in exchange for lending their names to litigation.5 It also 
established a rebuttable presumption that the lead plaintiff would be the 
applicant with the largest financial stake in the litigation.6 These provisions 
created strong incentives for large institutional investors to take control of 
securities class actions.  
In the wake of the PSLRA, concerns about professional plaintiffs 
largely faded.7 Since 1995, there has been scholarly debate over the role of 
large, institutional investors, but not an in-depth discussion of other, more 
traditional types of professional plaintiffs in corporate law scholarship.8 In 
short, scholars and policy makers have declared “Mission Accomplished” 
in the world of shareholder litigation.9  
Yet, entirely under the radar of corporate law scholarship, the war goes 
on. Professional plaintiffs have not disappeared—many have simply 
moved to other types of corporate lawsuits. Because the PSLRA only 
covers federal securities class actions,10 it does not apply to shareholder 
suits that arise under state law.11 In these suits, professional plaintiffs may 
                                                                                                                     
own a nominal number of shares in a wide array of public companies permit lawyers readily to file 
abusive securities class action lawsuits.”); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 6 (1995) (“Lawyers typically rely 
on repeat, or ‘professional,’ plaintiffs who, because they own a token number of shares in many 
companies, regularly lend their names to lawsuits.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin., supra note 1, at 54 
(letter from pension fund managers to Sens. Christopher Dodd and Pete Domenici); id. at 447–55 
(testimony of Bartlett Naylor, National Coordinator of the Office of Corporate Affairs, Int’l 
Brotherhood of Teamsters).  
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006). 
 5. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi), (4). 
 6. Id. §§ 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)–(v). 
 7. I am referring here to individuals who serve as plaintiffs in shareholder suits. As 
discussed below, many institutions—especially labor and public pension funds—have also begun to 
serve as repeat plaintiffs in these suits. This Article focuses almost exclusively on the role of 
individual plaintiffs, rather than these institutional plaintiffs. 
 8. Recent court decisions typically only mention professional plaintiffs when discussing pre-
PSLRA history or interpreting specific provisions in the PSLRA. See, e.g., In re ESS Tech., Inc. 
Secs. Litig., No. C-02-04497RMW, 2007 WL 3231729, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2007); In re 
Sterling Fin. Corp. Secs. Class Action, No. 07-2171, 2007 WL 4570729, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 
2007). The Milberg Weiss indictments were more recent, but related almost entirely to pre-PSLRA 
allegations. See infra pp. 7–9. 
 9. See President George W. Bush, Remarks on the USS Abraham Lincoln (May 1, 2003).  
 10. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) (2006). 
 11. As discussed below, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, which Congress 
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be alive and well, often using the exact same practices that Congress 
thought it eliminated back in 1995.  
How have professional plaintiffs stayed out of the legal limelight? In 
large part, the answer is that no one is looking for them. This Article shines 
a spotlight on the phenomenon of professional plaintiffs by looking in the 
most obvious place of all—the public record. This Article relies on 
publicly available documents to conduct the first examination of 
professional plaintiffs in shareholder litigation. These documents include 
court filings from state and federal courts across the country, including 
many unpublished decisions that have gone unnoticed in legal scholarship. 
This Article also relies on even less conventional sources, including 
business registration statements, marriage licenses, and obituaries.  
Who are the new professional plaintiffs? Research reveals four possible 
types of professional plaintiffs in shareholder litigation today. First, the 
plaintiffs are repeat plaintiffs.12 They file multiple lawsuits, some allegedly 
knowing little about the underlying claims. Second, the plaintiffs are 
attorneys or their family members.13 Rather than justifying their claims to 
independent shareholders, many attorneys appear to rely on their spouses,  
children, and other family members to serve as plaintiffs. Third, the 
plaintiffs may be entities created, at least in part, for the purpose of filing 
litigation.14 Some shareholders may have created partnerships or other 
entities for the primary purpose of filing litigation. Finally, some plaintiffs 
may not meet the most basic requirements for filing these lawsuits.15  
This phenomenon is disturbing, but is it widespread? The short answer 
is that we do not know. With limited public information, it is impossible to 
unearth the full extent of these practices. Yet the incentives in shareholder 
litigation, combined with the data presented here, give reason to believe 
that there may be a systemic problem, at least among some types of cases. 
Shareholder litigation is extremely profitable for plaintiffs’ attorneys, often 
resulting in hourly fees of $500 or more.16 Attorneys cannot file these suits 
without plaintiffs, a requirement that is considered “one of the most 
                                                                                                                     
passed after the PSLRA, preempts certain types of state law claims. It does not, however, preempt 
the claims at issue in this Article—shareholder derivative suits and most acquisition class actions. 
See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227, 
3229 (1998). 
 12. See infra Section II.A. 
 13. See infra Section II.B. 
 14. See infra Section II.C. 
 15. See infra Section II.D. 
 16. See Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware 
Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1830 (2004) (noting that for 
acquisition class action settlements that involved no monetary recovery, the median fee awarded 
was $472 per hour; for settlements that involved a monetary recovery, the median fee awarded was 
$1,240 per hour).  
4
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challenging aspects” of a class action.17 Add to that the fact that defense 
attorneys and judges rarely inquire into the background of shareholder 
plaintiffs,18 and incentives exist for unscrupulous behavior. 
These practices also cast a negative light on the vast majority of 
plaintifs’ law firms that likely do not engage in these practices.  Hearing 
about these practices, one could conclude that they are commonplace, even 
if they are in fact restricted to a fairly small group of firms.   Yet, the 
reputational effects may dissuade legitimate plaintiffs from getting 
involved in shareholder suits and may ultimately lessen the deterrence 
value of these suits.   
This impact should matter to corporate investors. Litigation plays a 
crucial role in protecting investors, allowing them to hold corporate 
managers accountable for their misdeeds. Yet, as the law and economics 
literature demonstrates, when left to their own devices, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
do not always make decisions that are in the best interests of investors.19 
Instead they can agree to what economists term “non-zero sum” 
settlements that benefit the plaintiffs’ attorney without the defendant 
incurring any significant loss, while “an absent third party, the corporation, 
bears the expenses of both sides.”20 These settlements are common in 
shareholder litigation.21 Shareholder plaintiffs are the last line of defense 
against these opportunistic settlements. By design, however, professional 
plaintiffs do not perform this function.22 In short, professional plaintiffs are 
a problem, both for investors and for the legal system more generally. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the old professional 
plaintiffs in shareholder litigation, detailing Congress’s efforts in the 1990s 
to eliminate these plaintiffs. Part II describes the new professional plaintiffs 
in shareholder litigation, combining empirical data with a discussion of 
illustrative cases. Part III builds on this discussion by proposing a new 
conceptual framework to address the problem of professional plaintiffs in 
                                                                                                                     
 17. BRIAN ANDERSON & ANDREW TRASK, THE CLASS ACTION PLAYBOOK 75 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2010).  
 18. See infra pp. 37–38.  
 19. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 671–72 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ 
Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1991); Weiss & White, supra note 16, at 
1799.  
 20. For a description of these settlements, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: 
The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 25 (1985).  
 21. See Jessica M. Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical 
Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1807–08 (2010); Weiss & White, supra note 16, at 1828. 
 22. Indeed, this problem first came to my attention through the efforts of two investors who 
had become disillusioned with the law’s efforts to protect their financial interests. These two 
investors have conducted considerable research into the problem of professional plaintiffs in 
shareholder litigation today, and their work was valuable in assisting my own efforts.  
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corporate litigation.  
I.  THE OLD PROFESSIONAL PLAINTIFFS 
In corporate litigation and elsewhere, professional plaintiffs have long 
been criticized as “professional pawn[s]” who help attorneys line their 
pockets at the expense of the real victims of legal injustice.23 This criticism 
was common in the corporate arena prior to the reform of the federal 
securities laws in 1995.24 The criticism focused on the most prominent area 
of corporate litigation—securities class actions. Unlike the state law claims 
addressed in Part II, securities class actions are brought under federal law. 
In securities class actions, shareholders typically allege that the corporation 
lied to the market about its business model or financial results. This Part 
provides an overview of the problem as it existed prior to 1995, as well as 
Congress’s efforts to solve it.  
A.  Historical Critique 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, corporate America claimed to be under 
attack in courtrooms across the country.25 Companies claimed that 
securities class actions were filed within days, or even hours, of a drop in 
the company’s stock price.26 As one executive asserted, “The duty to 
investigate has been reduced to perusal of the morning paper.”27 This 
charge was aimed largely at a single target—professional plaintiffs. This 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Rodriguez v. Investco, L.L.C., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285 (M.D. Fla. 2004); see also 
Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that some plaintiffs 
have created “litigation mill[s]” to “seek[] out and captur[e]” unlawful activity to use in their 
“prolific lawsuits”); Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 2005 WL 3019412, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 
2005) (denigrating professional plaintiffs as willing to accept a “quick and easy class settlement 
without the need for actually putting in any real effort representing the proposed class members in 
this action”). 
 24. These concerns are reflected in the Congressional Record leading up to the passage of the 
PSLRA. See supra note 2. 
 25. These claims are reflected in dozens of letters that corporations sent to members of 
Congress , as well as in the testimony of numerous corporate executives. See, e.g., Securities 
Litigation Reform Proposals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, 
Hous. & Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 19–21 (1995) (prepared statement of Christopher J. Murphy 
III, CEO, 1st Source Corporation); Letter from William E. Foster, Chairman & CEO, Stratus 
Computer, Inc., to Sen. Edward Kennedy (Dec. 27, 1993) (on file with author); Letter from Thomas 
M. Walker, CFO of Information Resources, Inc., to the Hon. Carol Moseley-Braun (July 5, 1994) 
(on file with author). 
 26. According to statements in Congress, approximately 20% of securities class actions were 
filed within forty-eight hours of the announcement of bad news. See Securities Litigation Reform 
Proposals: Hearings on S.240, S.667, and H.R. 1058 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. 
on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 118 (1995) (statement of Sen. Peter Domenici).  
 27. Supplemental Testimony of Stephen F. Smith, General Counsel and Dir. of Investor 
Relations of Exabyte Corp. Concerning Litigation Under the Fed. Sec. Laws Before the Subcomm. 
On Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 503 (1994). 
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Section describes the professional plaintiffs who drew the attention of 
Congress and the courts in the pre-1995 period. As we shall see, the debate 
regarding these plaintiffs was part of a broader debate about the role of 
litigation in policing corporate misconduct.  
1.  Repeat Plaintiffs 
The plaintiffs who most provoked Congress’s ire in the pre-1995 period 
were repeat plaintiffs who filed dozens of securities class actions.28 
According to conventional lore, these plaintiffs typically owned a small 
number of shares in a large number of public companies.29 These 
investment portfolios put them in a prime position to file lawsuits against a 
wide range of companies. As one judge wryly described them, these 
plaintiffs were “the unluckiest and most victimized investors in the history 
of the securities business.”30  
Viewed in isolation, repeat plaintiffs are not necessarily problematic. 
After all, plaintiffs who file multiple lawsuits get experience as class 
representatives. As a result, they may come to understand more about the 
underlying allegations in corporate fraud claims. In other words, 
experience might be a good thing.  
In Congress, however, no one seemed to think so. Congress was 
concerned that repeat plaintiffs were not properly representing the interests 
of absent class members.31 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that the named plaintiff in a class action must “fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.”32 In the early 1990s, 
lawmakers were concerned that repeat plaintiffs were not fulfilling this 
obligation for two reasons.  
First, Congress believed that many repeat plaintiffs knew little about the 
lawsuits brought in their names.33 As one congressional report noted, “In 
many cases the ‘lead plaintiff’ has not even read the complaint.”34 This fact 
was problematic because the role of representative plaintiffs is to monitor 
class counsel, ensuring that litigation decisions reflect the best interests of 
the class. Shareholder plaintiffs who are not familiar with the underlying 
claims cannot perform this responsibility. To be fair, Congress may have 
overstated the role of these plaintiffs. Shareholder plaintiffs often play a 
nominal role in class action litigation, and many attorneys operate 
“virtually [as] independent entrepreneur[s]” in a role similar to a private 
                                                                                                                     
 28. See, e.g., supra note 2. 
 29. See id. 
 30. In re Urcarco Secs. Litig., 148 F.R.D. 561, 563 (N.D. Tex. 1993).  
  31. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 33 (1995). 
 32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  
 33. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 33 (Conf. Rep.). 
 34. See id. 
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attorney general.35 Yet Congress wanted a greater role for shareholder 
plaintiffs in securities class actions.  
Second, Congress suspected that shareholders were being paid to serve 
as repeat plaintiffs in securities class actions. In its official legislative 
report, the House of Representatives stated that “lead plaintiffs often 
receive compensation in the form of bounty payments or bonuses.”36 The 
Senate Report similarly stated that “[p]rofessional plaintiffs often are 
motivated by the payment of a ‘bonus’ far in excess of their share of any 
recovery.”37 Such payments created a conflict of interest between the 
shareholder plaintiff and the rest of the class. While class members want 
the highest possible recovery, named plaintiffs who have been promised a 
kickback may be more interested in securing their own personal payout 
than in protecting the class.  
Later investigations proved lawmakers right. The Department of Justice 
subsequently brought criminal charges against the largest plaintiffs’ firm in 
the country, Milberg Weiss LLP, and four of the firm’s attorneys.38 These 
charges related almost exclusively to conduct that occurred prior to 1995. 
During this time period, as the defendants later admitted, the firm 
maintained a roster of shareholders to serve as plaintiffs in securities class 
actions.39 The firm paid those shareholders a portion of the fees that the 
firms received, typically 10%.40 According to court documents, “[b]y 
entering into such secret payment arrangements, [the attorneys] were able 
to secure a reliable source of individuals who were ready, willing, and able 
to serve as named plaintiffs in [c]lass [a]ctions that Milberg Weiss wanted 
to bring.”41 Following the indictments, Milberg Weiss agreed to pay $75 
million dollars to settle the criminal charges,42 and certain partners at the 
firm agreed to pay substantial fines and go to prison.43 In short, Congress 
                                                                                                                     
 35. Coffee, supra note 19, at 681.  
 36. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 33 (Conf. Rep.).  
 37. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 10 (1995).  
 38. See First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman 
LLP, CR 05-587(A) (May 18, 2006 C.D. Cal.). 
 39. Statement of Facts in Support of David J. Bershad Plea Agreement and Information, 
United States v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, CR 05-587(A)-JFW., 2009 BL 152534 ¶ 4 
(C.D. Cal. July 6, 2007). 
 40. Id. ¶ 6. 
 41. Id. ¶ 7.  
 42. A Stiff Fine, but No Trial, for Milberg, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2008, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 2008/06/17/milberg-firm-said-to-be-near-a-deal/ (explaining that 
under the firm’s latest agreement with prosecutors, the firm will pay the government $75 million). 
 43. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California, 
William Lerach, Former Name Partner in Milberg Weiss, to Plead Guilty to Conspiracy to Obstruct 
Justice and Make False Statements to Federal Judges across U.S. (Sept. 18, 2007) (noting that a 
former partner agreed to plead guilty; to pay a $250,000 fine; to forfeit $7.75 million to the 
government; and to receive a one to two year sentence in federal prison); A Stiff Fine, but 
No Trial, for Milberg, supra note 42 (explaining that one of the firm’s famous partners is in prison 
8
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was right when it suspected back in 1995 that at least some plaintiffs were 
being paid to participate in securities class actions.  
2.  Lawyers and Their Families as Plaintiffs 
During this pre-1995 period, many plaintiffs’ lawyers also served as 
plaintiffs in shareholder suits. There is no empirical data reflecting how 
often this occurred, but academic scholarship discussed the phenomenon 
openly. Professor John Coffee observed, for example, that “some 
plaintiff’s law firms [have] even invested their own firm’s profit-sharing 
plan broadly in the stocks of numerous corporations in order to have an in-
house plaintiff at hand.”44 He also stated that “[f]requently . . . one 
plaintiff’s attorney will serve as a client for another.”45 Similarly, in 1993, 
Fortune Magazine documented how a well-known plaintiffs’ firm had 
asked another plaintiffs’ attorney to “provide the . . . firm with a list of his 
stock holdings . . . and keep it up to date,” allowing the firm to file at least 
six securities class actions on the attorney’s behalf.46 
As courts have recognized, these cases raised the possibility of a 
conflict of interest between the attorney plaintiff and the rest of the class. 
In the 1993 decision Jaroslawicz v. Safety Kleen Corp.,47 for example, a 
federal court denied plaintiff David Jaroslawicz’s motion to serve as class 
representative in a securities class action.48 In denying the motion, the 
court noted that Mr. Jaroslawicz, a personal injury attorney in New York 
City, had served as co-counsel in at least forty-two other cases with 
Pomerantz Levy Haudek Block & Grossman (Pomerantz Levy), one of the 
two firms representing the class.49 In other words, Mr. Jaroslawicz was 
represented by Pomerantz Levy in the lawsuit before the court, but was co-
counsel with Pomerantz Levy in a number of other suits. As a result, Mr. 
Jaroslawicz potentially had a significant financial interest in maintaining 
the goodwill of Pomerantz Levy, which the court feared could overshadow 
his commitment to the class.50 The court also stated that the litigation 
appeared to be “manufactured,” and it noted that Mr. Jaroslawicz owned 
only thirteen and a half shares of stock in the defendant corporation, worth 
approximately $400.51  
There was also evidence in the pre-1995 period that lawyers used their 
family members as plaintiffs. Cases during this period included examples 
                                                                                                                     
and another one is headed there under an announced guilty plea).  
 44. Coffee, supra note 19, at 682. 
 45. Id. at 682–83 n.39.  
 46. Andrew E. Serwer, What to Do About Legal Blackmail, FORTUNE, Nov. 15, 1993, available 
at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1993/11/15/78596/index. htm.  
 47. 151 F.R.D. 324 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
 48. Id. at 326.  
 49. Id. at 328.  
 50. Id. at 329–30. 
 51. Id. at 326, 330. 
9
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of attorneys using their spouses,52 parents,53 siblings,54 and other close 
relatives55 as plaintiffs in securities class actions.  
These cases, predictably, raised the ire of the courts. In many cases, 
courts expressed concern that the plaintiff would share in the eventual 
attorneys’ fees received by their attorney relative, and that these payouts 
could influence the plaintiff’s representation of the class. In one case, for 
example, a federal court held that a plaintiff was an inadequate class 
representative because her husband was class counsel.56 The court 
determined that “the potential conflict of interest inherent in this situation 
is obvious” because “the possible recovery of [the plaintiff] as a member of 
the class is far exceeded by the financial interest she and her husband, as a 
marital unit, might have in the legal fees engendered by this lawsuit.”57  
3.  Entities as Plaintiffs 
During this same time period, there were also indications that lawyers 
may have established entities for the purpose of filing litigation. For 
example, according to press accounts in 1993, an attorney in New Jersey 
was suspended from the practice of law for using his own companies as 
plaintiffs in his lawsuits.58 The press reported that this suspension arose 
specifically out of shareholder lawsuits filed against the Trump casinos.59 
The lawsuits were filed by two different entities, Peter Stuyvesant Ltd. and 
Fairmount Financial Corp., using two different legal theories.60 An 
investigation determined that Stuyvesant and Fairmount were in fact 
related and that both entities were owned by one of the attorneys in the 
litigation.61 The court was extremely critical when it discovered this 
connection, stating that “[c]lass representatives are supposed to occupy a 
                                                                                                                     
 52. See, e.g., Stull v. Poole, 63 F.R.D. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).  
 53. See, e.g., Kirby v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 303, 309 (D. Mass. 1987).  
 54. See, e.g., Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 95 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 55. See, e.g., In re Consumers Power Co. Secs. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583, 603 (D. Mich. 1985).  
 56. Stull, 63 F.R.D. at 704. 
 57. Id. As we shall see, this decision has not stopped other members of the firm from relying 
on their own family members to serve as plaintiffs. See infra text accompanying notes 159–77. 
Other courts raised related concerns even in cases where the plaintiff would not share in the 
attorneys’ fees. See Susman, 561 F.2d at 95. On the other hand, a few courts have sanctioned these 
relationships, holding that the relative was capable of monitoring the litigation given the particular 
circumstances of the case. See, e.g., Lewis v. Goldsmith, 95 F.R.D. 15, 20 (D.N.J. 1982) (permitting 
the plaintiff to serve as the class representative even though his uncle was class counsel). 
 58. See L. Stuart Ditzen, Richard Greenfield Is Barred by U.S. Court for One Year, 
PHILADELPHIA ENQUIRER, Dec. 23, 1993, available at http://articles.philly.com/1993-12-
23/business/25943547_1_federal-courts-class-action. 
 59. See L. Stuart Ditzen, Class-Action Lawyer Suspended, Fined in N.J. for Ethical 
Violations, PHILA. ENQUIRER, Nov. 17, 1993, available at http://articles.philly.com/1993-11-
17/business/25945045_1_class-action-suits-class-action-lawyer-trump-casinos/2.  
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/2
2013] THE NEW PROFESSSIONAL PLAINTIFFS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 1099 
 
position of trust, championing the interests of the multitude of persons they 
represent.”62 The court referred the matter to state disciplinary 
authorities,63 and the attorney appears to have been fined and suspended 
from the practice of law.64  
B.  The Problems with the Old Professional Plaintiffs 
As the examples above illustrate, lawmakers were aware of a variety of 
problems with professional plaintiffs prior to 1995. These problems all 
reflected the same core concern about the plaintiffs’ ability to represent 
absent class members in securities class actions. Plaintiffs with a conflict 
of interest in the litigation—whether the promise of a private payment or 
the hope of future business from class counsel—could be tempted to put 
their own interests ahead of the interests of the class. Such conflicts could 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for the named plaintiffs to protect the 
interests of the class.  
These conflicts may not appear particularly troubling given the 
traditional role of shareholder plaintiffs in class action litigation. Conflict 
of interest or not, these plaintiffs rarely have a meaningful role in the 
litigation. Shareholder plaintiffs typically have a minimal financial stake in 
the litigation, and whatever stake they do have is dwarfed by that of the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys who stand to receive significant contingency fees. As a 
result, one could legitimately ask why Congress was so concerned about 
professional plaintiffs back in 1995. If plaintiffs rarely played a meaningful 
role in these cases, why worry about professional plaintiffs?  
And yet Congress was worried. Congress believed that the traditional 
model of entrepreneurial litigation was broken, at least in securities class 
actions. In an ideal world, plaintiffs’ attorneys protect the interests of 
absent class members. The legal system tries to accomplish this ideal by 
awarding plaintiffs’ attorneys a percentage of the overall recovery. This fee 
structure is designed to ensure that plaintiffs’ attorneys have an incentive to 
bargain for the largest possible recovery. 
The problem is that these incentives do not always work, as scholars 
have long recognized.65 The fact that plaintiffs’ attorneys receive a 
                                                                                                                     
 62. Ditzen, supra note 58. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. There is a substantial body of literature on the dangers of a purely entrepreneurial model 
of shareholder litigation. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the 
Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 221 n.15 (1983) 
(discussing issues of risk aversion, potential for collusion, an inadequate system, property rights, 
and the disparity in search costs); Coffee, supra note 19, at 679 (discussing “opportunism and 
overenforcement”); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in 
Class Action: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1377–78 (2000) (analyzing 
issues of sweetheart and blackmail settlements); Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? 
A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 38, 72 (2002) 
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percentage of the ultimate settlement does not always mean that their 
incentives are aligned with those of the absent class members. As the 
research of Professor John Coffee and others has demonstrated, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys have incentives that often cause them to underinvest in certain 
types of shareholder litigation and overinvest in others.66 In the types of 
suits targeted by professional plaintiffs, the concern was that attorneys 
were overinvesting in litigation.  
As discussed above, many believed that attorneys in the early 1990s 
were filing securities class actions based on the hint of wrongdoing.67 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys then used securities class actions as a means to obtain 
discovery from the target corporation. This discovery was typically one-
sided, with the plaintiffs’ attorneys requesting mountains of documents 
from the defendants but having little to produce themselves. Many 
corporations agreed to nuisance settlements to avoid the high cost of 
discovery and the risk of an unfavorable jury verdict at trial. In the words 
of the chairman of America Online, Inc., “Even when a company 
committed no fraud, indeed no negligence, there is still the remote 
possibility of huge jury verdicts, not to mention the costs of litigation. In 
the face of such exposure, defendant companies inevitably settle these suits 
rather than go to trial.”68 
Congress believed that these practices had a negative impact on 
investors. Shareholder litigation represents a transfer of wealth from one 
group of shareholders to another.69 In a securities class action, existing 
shareholders typically pay former shareholders who bought their stock 
during the class period.70 This wealth transfer makes sense if it deters 
misconduct or disgorges ill-gotten gains. When litigation is filed to procure 
a nuisance settlement, however, these gains disappear. In the mid-1990s, 
Congress believed that many securities class actions were strike suits—
profitable for attorneys, but not beneficial for investors or the market more 
generally. 
Admittedly, the testimony before Congress reflected a fairly one-sided 
view of the issues. Corporate America mounted a strong lobbying effort in 
Congress, and the actual problems may well not have been as serious as the 
                                                                                                                     
(commenting on collusion, sweetheart deals, and settlement inefficiencies).  
 66. See Coffee, supra note 65, at 243; Coffee, supra note 19, at 686–90. These concerns are 
not a uniquely American phenomenon. See Erik P.M. Vermeulen & Dirk A. Zetzsche, The Use and 
Abuse of Investor Suits: An Inquiry into the Dark Side of Shareholder Activism, 7 EUR. COMPANY & 
FIN. L. REV. 1, 71–72 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1428901 (discussing the use of professional plaintiffs in European shareholder litigation).  
 67. See supra pp. 6–7.  
 68. H.R. REP. NO. 104-50, pt. 1, at 17 (1995). 
 69. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence 
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1557–61 (2006); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the 
Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 334 (2009). 
 70. Coffee, supra note 69, at 1557. 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/2
2013] THE NEW PROFESSSIONAL PLAINTIFFS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 1101 
 
companies claimed. Yet even critics of this effort recognized the need for a 
better monitor of shareholder interest in these suits.  For example, 
Professor Joel Seligman, who argued against widespread legal changes to 
the federal securities laws, stated that he was “impressed by the testimony” 
related to professional plaintiffs and agreed that these plaintiffs tended to 
“undermine the integrity” of the judicial process.71 
When it comes to identifying a better monitor of shareholder interests, 
securities class actions enjoy a distinct advantage over other types of class 
action litigation. In many class actions, the plaintiffs have only a minimal 
stake in the outcome. A plaintiff who is suing over a $5 free drink coupon 
likely does not have the financial incentive to monitor the litigation.72 In 
securities class actions, however, many shareholders do have a significant 
financial interest in the litigation. Many large investors have millions of 
dollars at stake in securities class actions, far more than the typical class 
action plaintiff. Accordingly, shareholder litigation was uniquely situated 
for reforms that placed more power in the hands of strong shareholder 
plaintiffs. 
C.  Legislative Attack 
The problems in securities class actions ultimately led to broad-based 
support for new legislation in both houses of Congress. In 1995, Congress 
passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.73 The PSLRA did not 
apply to shareholder suits filed under state law, including shareholder 
derivative suits and acquisition class actions, but it did place strict 
limitations on securities class actions filed under federal law.  
Most importantly, the PSLRA ended the race to the courthouse in 
which the attorney with the first-filed complaint would typically receive 
control over the litigation.74 Instead Congress established a rebuttable 
presumption that the investor with the largest financial loss would be the 
lead plaintiff, a provision that was designed to put these suits in the hands 
of large institutional investors.75 As one representative of institutional 
investors testified before Congress, “As the largest shareholders in most 
companies, we are the ones who have the most to gain from meritorious 
                                                                                                                     
 71. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin., supra note 1, at 70–72 (1994) 
(statements of Professor Joel Seligman).  
 72. See Class Action Complaint, Levitt v. Southwest Airlines Co., 846 F. Supp. 2d 956, 957–
58 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (explaining that plaintiff, who is also a lawyer at the well-known plaintiffs’ firm 
of Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, filed a class action challenging Southwest 
Airline’s decision not to honor free drink coupons).  
 73. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 74. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 33 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that this practice caused 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to become “fleet of foot and sleight of hand”). 
 75. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006). 
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securities litigation.”76  
The PSLRA also included provisions aimed directly at professional 
plaintiffs. The Act provided that no plaintiff shall serve in more than five 
securities class actions in a three-year period.77 Additionally, plaintiffs 
were barred from receiving any compensation other than their pro rata 
share of the recovery and reimbursement for reasonable costs and 
expenses.78 Finally, plaintiffs were required to file a sworn statement with 
the complaint certifying that they (1) had reviewed the complaint and 
authorized its filing, (2) had not purchased the securities at the direction of 
counsel or to participate in a lawsuit, and (3) were willing to serve on 
behalf of the class.79 The certification also had to list any transactions in 
the securities during the class period and identify any other lawsuits in 
which the plaintiff had sought to serve as lead plaintiff over the past three 
years.80 These restrictions were designed to put securities class actions in 
the hands of plaintiffs with a real financial stake in the litigation.  
The relief that corporate America felt following the passage of the 
PSLRA was short-lived. The PSLRA only applies to fraud claims brought 
under the federal securities laws.81 Lawyers quickly learned that they could 
make nearly the same allegations under state law and thereby avoid the 
strict requirements of the PSLRA. Armed with this statutory loophole, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys took their old tactics to a new venue.  
Just a few years after the passage of the PSLRA, Congress was 
presented with compelling evidence that its efforts had simply shifted the 
problems to state court.82 While the number of securities fraud cases filed 
in federal court had declined, there was an equal increase in the number of 
state law securities fraud cases.83 In California alone, the number of state 
securities class action filings in the first six months of 1996 was almost 
five times greater than in the first six months of 1995.84 The SEC called 
this shift potentially “the most significant development in securities 
litigation” since passage of the PSLRA.85 The SEC’s testimony prompted 
Congress to pass the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
(SLUSA)86 in 1998. The SLUSA expressly preempted many state law 
                                                                                                                     
 76. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34 (Conf. Rep.). 
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi). 
 78. Id. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(vi). 
 79. Id. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii). 
 80. Id. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(iv)–(v). 
 81. Id. §78u-4(b). 
 82. H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 14–15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). 
 83. See id. at 14 (citation omitted).  
 84. Id. at 15. (The first six months of 1995 were prior to the passage of the PSLRA.) 
 85. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE  COMM’N OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNS., REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES 
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 (1997). 
 86. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 
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fraud claims, preventing attorneys from filing the same suits under a 
different body of law.  
The SLUSA, however, included a carve-out that has proven crucial in 
the subsequent revival of professional plaintiffs—it exempted all 
shareholder derivative suits and many acquisition class actions.87 A 
shareholder derivative suit is a suit filed under state law to vindicate 
alleged wrongs committed against the corporation.88 The typical claim is 
that the corporation’s managers harmed the corporation by breaching their 
fiduciary duties to the corporation. Acquisition class actions are also 
brought under state fiduciary duty law, but the allegations relate 
specifically to a proposed merger or acquisition. In these suits, the 
shareholders typically allege that the corporation’s board of directors 
breached its fiduciary duties by agreeing to sell the corporation for a price 
below the corporation’s true value.89 Congress likely spared these suits 
from preemption because it was focused on the more traditional fraud 
claims that shareholders were filing to avoid the PSLRA.90  
With the passage of the SLUSA, Congress believed that its work in this 
area was finally complete. The PSLRA targeted abusive practices in 
securities litigation, and the follow-up legislation in 1998 gave the 
necessary teeth to the PSLRA’s restrictions. 
This legislation has accomplished many, but certainly not all, of its 
stated goals. Today, institutional investors—primarily labor and public 
pension funds—serve as the lead plaintiffs in approximately two-thirds of 
all securities class actions.91 The role of these plaintiffs, however, many of 
whom have become repeat plaintiffs themselves, has not been without 
controversy.92 Studies show that they have been able to obtain slightly 
                                                                                                                     
3227 (enacted to amend the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 87. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d), (f)(2)(B) (2006).  
 88. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). 
 89. In recent years, the lines between these suits have begun to blur. My own research shows 
that many derivative complaints now include federal securities claims. Erickson, supra note 21, at 
1774. Other commentators have noted the rise of federal claims in acquisition class actions. See 
Kevin LaCroix, A Closer Look at 2011 Securities Lawsuit Filings, THE D&O DIARY (Jan. 3, 2012), 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2012/01/articles/securities-litigation/a-closer-look-at-2011-secu rities-
lawsuit-filings/ (stating that more than one quarter of all securities class actions in 2011 related to 
mergers or acquisitions).  
 90. In addition, these suits have traditionally been within the province of state law, and 
Congress may have been hesitant to extend its reach in this area any more than necessary. See, e.g., 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 17 (1998) (noting that the SLUSA includes “an exception to preserve 
[s]tate court jurisdiction over derivative actions”).  
 91. Ellen M. Ryan & Laura E. Simmons, Securities Class Action Settlements: 2010 Review 
and Analysis, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, at 8 (2011), http://www.cornerstone.com/files/News/029 
b31a7-ff84-4000-b1ff-d177014ced27/Presentation/NewsAttachment/fd13e1e4-5564-4d46-86a3-
882f232147a9/Cornerstone_Research_Settlements_2010_Analysis.pdf. 
 92. Scholars, for example, have raised concerns that plaintiffs’ attorneys may make 
substantial campaign contributions to politicians who oversee labor and public pension funds in the 
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better settlements for shareholders, at least in part vindicating Congress’s 
faith in them.93 
In the wake of these legislative reforms, concerns about individuals 
serving as professional plaintiffs faded from view. There has been no 
examination of professional plaintiffs in corporate law scholarship since 
1995.94 As we shall see, however, the legal system has not won the war 
against professional plaintiffs. Instead these plaintiffs may have simply 
moved into new legal territory. 
II.  THE NEW PROFESSIONAL PLAINTIFFS 
As this Part documents, professional plaintiffs may be alive and well in 
shareholder litigation. And they appear to be using many of the same 
practices that Congress thought it eradicated back in the 1990s. In the wake 
of the legislative reforms, professional plaintiffs shifted into state law 
shareholder suits, specifically, acquisition class actions and shareholder 
derivative suits. The discussion below groups these practices, and the 
allegations that relate to them, into four categories: (1) using the same 
shareholders in multiple lawsuits; (2) using plaintiffs’ lawyers or their 
family members as plaintiffs; (3) using questionable entities as plaintiffs; 
and (4) using shareholders who may not meet the basic qualifications to 
serve as plaintiffs, including dead plaintiffs and plaintiffs who may not 
know they are plaintiffs. These phenomena have flown under the radar of 
corporate law scholarship and raise questions about the legitimacy of these 
lawsuits. 
An introductory caveat is important. This Article defines “professional 
plaintiffs” to include the four types of plaintiffs above. The use of this term 
does not imply anything about the plaintiffs’ involvement in these suits or 
their motivation for filing these suits. Similarly, to the extent that the 
                                                                                                                     
hopes of representing these funds in securities suits. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., The Price of 
Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 650, 650–51 (2011); James D. 
Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in 
Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1611–14 (2006).  
 93. The empirical evidence is somewhat mixed, but it generally shows that institutional 
investors have had a positive impact on settlement values. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions 
Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 
83 WASH. U. L. Q. 869, 870 (2005) (finding that participation by public pension funds correlates 
with a greater likelihood of a high value outcome but not willing to claim finding as conclusive); 
James D. Cox et al., There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of 
Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 385 (2008); Ryan & Simmons, supra 
note 91, at 8. 
 94. The one notable exception is the research on acquisition class actions published by Robert 
Thompson and Randall Thomas in 2004. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New 
Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 187–
89 (2004). In their article, Thompson and Thomas report detailed findings on the plaintiffs in 
acquisition class actions filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1999 and 2000. These findings 
are discussed below.  
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discussion below relies on allegations raised in various lawsuits, the 
veracity of these allegations generally cannot be determined from the 
available record.  In the end, therefore, the illustrations and allegations 
below do not, and indeed could not, cast aspersions on any particular 
plaintiffs or on the plaintiffs in corporate litigation more generally. The 
most they can do is illustrate that many of the practices targeted by 
Congress may still occur today.  
A.  Repeat Plaintiffs 
In enacting the PSLRA, Congress criticized repeat plaintiffs in 
securities class actions as the “world’s unluckiest investors.”95 As this 
Section illustrates, this bad luck has apparently continued. Although the 
PSLRA largely halted the use of repeat plaintiffs in federal securities class 
actions,96 the use of repeat plaintiffs has continued in shareholder lawsuits 
filed under state law. This Section provides empirical data regarding the 
use of repeat plaintiffs before turning to illustrative cases that highlight this 
practice.  
1.  Empirical Data 
To understand the role of repeat plaintiffs in shareholder litigation 
today, one must first understand what is meant by a “repeat plaintiff.” This 
Section uses the following definition: a shareholder is a repeat plaintiff if 
he or she filed more than three shareholder suits over the period between 
2009 and 2012 or five shareholder suits over the period between 2002 and 
2012. This definition identifies plaintiffs who are regular filers of these 
suits, while also giving more scrutiny to plaintiffs who have filed multiple 
lawsuits in recent years.  
I used several methods to track these repeat plaintiffs.97 First, I used 
data collected as part of a prior empirical study on shareholder litigation in 
federal court.98 Second, I supplemented that data with additional data on 
state law shareholder suits in both state and federal court.99 Third, I used 
                                                                                                                     
 95. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).  
 96. As discussed below, repeat plaintiffs still play a small role in securities class actions, 
although the exact nature of this role is unclear.  
 97. This effort, while data-driven, was not intended to identify all repeat plaintiffs. Online 
state and federal docket systems are often woefully incomplete, making it impossible to identify all 
shareholder suits filed by these plaintiffs. See Bernard Black et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 
at 17, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578404 (noting that these limitations 
mean that it is simply “not feasible” to examine all corporate law cases).  
 98. This data covered shareholder derivative suits filed in federal court in 2005 and 2006. See 
Erickson, supra note 21, at 1757–58. 
 99. I conducted a number of searches in the dockets database and the pleadings database in 
Westlaw to identify suits filed by repeat plaintiffs between 2002 and 2012. I also searched in the 
EDGAR database, which includes filings with the Securities & Exchange Commission by publicly 
traded corporations, for the names of many of these plaintiffs.  
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data on federal securities class actions, which was generously provided by 
Cornerstone Research, Stephen Choi, and Adam Pritchard.100 This 
combined data, while not a complete list of all shareholder suits, allowed 
me to identify a significant number of repeat plaintiffs. I then searched for 
these plaintiffs in the Dockets database in Westlaw to get a more precise 
count of the suits that they filed between 2002 and 2012.101  
In doing so, I uncovered more than 700 lawsuits filed by repeat 
plaintiffs during this ten-year period. These lawsuits were filed by more 
than sixty repeat plaintiffs who filed an average of eleven lawsuits each.102 
These plaintiffs were not always the only plaintiffs in these lawsuits. Many 
shareholder lawsuits have multiple plaintiffs, and in many cases, more than 
one repeat plaintiff filed a lawsuit against a single company. These figures 
thus reflect the pervasiveness of repeat plaintiffs in shareholder litigation.   
These suits were primarily filed under state law. As Table 2 below 
illustrates, nearly half of these suits (47.8%) were acquisition class actions. 
Another 29.3% were shareholder derivative suits. A smaller percentage of 
these suits (16.8%) were securities class actions, indicating that repeat 
plaintiffs do still exist in these suits as well. The remaining suits were other 
types of shareholder lawsuits or could not be categorized based on the 
information available.103  
This mix is changing over time.  Between 2010 and 2012, nearly 65 
percent of cases involving repeat plaintiffs were acquisition class actions, 
up from approximately 35 percent between 2002 and 2009. The increasing 
use of repeat plaintiffs in these cases likely reflects the fact that acquisition 
class actions have skyrocketed in popularity in recent years, forcing 
plaintiffs’ firms to maintain a larger stable of shareholders willing to serve 
as plaintiff at a moment’s notice. 
A few of these plaintiffs are well-known to corporate lawyers. Alan R. 
Kahn, for example, has been termed a “quasi-mythical figure[]” by the 
Delaware Court of Chancery.104 He has served as the plaintiff in many 
landmark Delaware decisions,105 several of which involve controlling 
                                                                                                                     
 100. This data identifies the lead plaintiff or first-filed plaintiff in securities class actions filed 
between 2002 and 2011. I used this data because many plaintiffs who file securities class actions 
also file state law shareholder suits.  
 101. Given the limitations of these databases, these searches are necessarily underinclusive 
and, accordingly, the numbers presented throughout this Subsection are only estimates. 
 102. These figures do not include plaintiffs’ attorneys or their family members who serve as 
plaintiffs. Nor do they include institutions who serve as plaintiffs in multiple suits. Such plaintiffs 
are discussed separately in subsequent sections.  
 103. In many securities class actions involving repeat plaintiffs in my study, the repeat plaintiff 
owned a relatively small number of shares in the target corporation and typically did not seek 
appointment as lead plaintiff. 
 104. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 943 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 105. See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n 
Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995); Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991). 
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shareholder transactions, an area in which shareholders are particularly 
vulnerable. Based on the publicly available data reviewed here, Mr. Kahn 
or members of his family have filed forty-five lawsuits over the past ten 
years.106  
Yet there are many more repeat plaintiffs who have not captured the 
attention of courts and commentators. Doris and Steven Staehr, for 
example, appear to have filed more shareholder suits than any plaintiff in 
my study other than Alan Kahn—a total of forty lawsuits.107 Yet, in 
discussions with defense counsel, few recognized their names. Nor have 
the Staehrs drawn the attention of judges. The same is true for most of the 
other repeat plaintiffs in my data set. These plaintiffs may have filed ten, 
twenty, or even thirty lawsuits, but they rarely attract scrutiny. The next 
question is whether they deserve scrutiny. 
2.  Concerns about Repeat Plaintiffs 
Should the legal system care about repeat plaintiffs? Many repeat 
plaintiffs may well be faithful stewards of shareholder interests, but as 
Judge Frank Easterbrook observed, a repeat plaintiff “could be tempted to 
file suits designed to extract payoffs from the corporation even if the 
average investor will lose in the process.”108 My research uncovers two 
specific reasons for this concern. First, some repeat plaintiffs appear to 
have little involvement in the suits filed on their behalf. Second, there are 
allegations that at least a few plaintiffs have been paid in exchange for 
lending their names to litigation. These concerns are unsubstantiated, but 
nonetheless mirror Congress’s concerns in the 1990s, raising serious 
questions about the ability of some repeat plaintiffs to protect absent class 
members.  
                                                                                                                     
 106. My data indicates that between 2002 and 2012, Mr. Kahn personally filed forty-two 
shareholder lawsuits. His wife and daughter have filed an additional three. Mr. Kahn has a long 
history in the investing community, and he appears motivated by a strong commitment to corporate 
governance. 
 107. See, e.g., Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Waste 
of Corporate Assets and Unjust Enrichment, Staehr v. Miller, No. 1:08-cv-20990-PAS (S.D. Fla. 
Apr. 11, 2008); Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Waste of 
Corporate Assets, Unjust Enrichment and Violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Staehr 
v. Essner, No. 1:07-cv-10465-RJS (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2007); Verified Shareholder Derivative 
Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Abuse of Control, Constructive Fraud, Gross 
Mismanagement, Waste of Corporate Assets, Unjust Enrichment, Breach of Fiduciary Duties and 
for Violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Staehr v. Burns, No. 3:06-cv-07069-JGC (N.D. 
Ohio Mar. 2, 2006). The relationship between Doris and Steven Staehr is not clear, but they may be 
mother and son.  
 108. Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 954 (2006). Again, my goal is not to 
criticize all shareholder plaintiffs or even all shareholder plaintiffs who file a significant number of 
lawsuits. Some shareholder plaintiffs take a very active role in litigation and serve as effective 
monitors. My concern, as outlined below, is that others may not perform this role and that the 
judicial system does little to distinguish between these two types of shareholder plaintiffs.  
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a.  Little Involvement in Litigation 
Some repeat plaintiffs appear to have very little involvement in the 
underlying litigation. Courts have long recognized that plaintiffs in 
shareholder lawsuits are “nominal” plaintiffs and that attorneys therefore 
control the suits.109 Yet, shareholder plaintiffs still have a duty to monitor 
the litigation and exercise control over their attorneys.110 Some plaintiffs in 
my study appear to be fulfilling this role diligently. Others may not be. 
In one case, for example, a federal judge in the Southern District of 
New York castigated plaintiff Robert Garber for being “appallingly 
ignorant of the many derivative actions that have been filed in his 
name.”111 Mr. Garber had filed more than twenty shareholder lawsuits 
against corporations and their managers.112 When questioned about these 
cases, Mr. Garber “generally could not recall basic information” about 
them, including where the suits were filed, the basic allegations in the 
suits, or in some instances, the corporations named as defendants.113 The 
court noted that the record in the case was “startling” and reflected an 
“absentee plaintiff[]” who was “at the beck and call of his friend and 
fellow attorney [Alfred G.] Yates.”114  
The Delaware Court of Chancery has raised similar concerns about 
another shareholder plaintiff with an “uncanny zeal for litigation.”115 The 
court stated that it was “troubl[ed]” by the plaintiff’s participation in the 
suit because he owned only twenty-five shares of stock in the corporation, 
which were purchased after the initial allegations of wrongdoing had 
already emerged.116 Moreover, the court noted that the plaintiff had a 
“surprising level of ignorance with respect to other lawsuits in which he is 
a representative plaintiff.”117 The court stated that it could not “conclude 
that [the plaintiff] is in cahoots with his counsel to generate class and 
derivative litigation in bad faith. Yet when a person jumps in the ocean and 
then complains of getting wet, one certainly has to wonder.”118  
                                                                                                                     
 109. Coffee, supra note 19, at 674, 678 (referencing courts’ emphasis that plaintiff’s attorneys 
have “no ‘true’ identifiable client”). 
 110. Cf. Jaroslawicz v. Safety Kleen Corp., 151 F.R.D. 324, 328–30 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting 
adequacy of representation in part because of plaintiff’s desire to maintain goodwill with counsel, 
which could lead to sub-optimal class outcome). 
 111. In re JPMorgan Chase & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 1:08-cv-00974-DLC, 2008 
WL 4298588, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2008). 
 112. The exact number of suits is unclear. He testified in the JPMorgan litigation that he has 
filed “approximately twenty-five other actions against corporations and their officers.” Id. at *5. My 
research found that he has filed approximately twenty suits in the last ten years.  
 113. See id.  
 114. See id. at *8–9.  
 115. In re Fuqua Indus. Inc. S’holder Litig., 752 A.2d 126, 134 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
 116. Id. n.27.  
 117. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 118. Id. (some punctuation omitted). Despite these concerns, the court declined to disqualify 
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My research highlights two reasons to wonder about the involvement of 
some repeat plaintiffs. First, certain plaintiffs filed many of their lawsuits 
within a fairly short period of time. For example, one plaintiff filed more 
than two dozen lawsuits in 2011 and 2012.119 Another plaintiff appears to 
have filed nine lawsuits in 2006 and seven lawsuits in 2007. The fact that 
these plaintiffs have a significant number of suits pending at once may 
raise questions about their ability to monitor these suits.120  
Second, several repeat plaintiffs appear to own a relatively small 
number of shares in the companies they sue.121 This is not always the case; 
some repeat plaintiffs own thousands of shares.122 In many cases, however, 
the plaintiff appeared to own a fairly small number of shares in the target 
corporation—as little as nine shares of stock.123  
b.  Alleged Payments to Plaintiffs 
Repeat plaintiffs also raise concerns because of allegations that some 
have been paid to participate in litigation, allegations that resemble those 
from the pre-PSLRA period. One example can be found in Carrigan v. 
                                                                                                                     
Mr. Freberg as a plaintiff in the suit, holding that he “does in fact understand the basic nature of the 
derivative claims brought in his name, even if barely so.” Id. at 134. 
 119. For a selection of these suits, see Coyne v. Morton’s Rest. Group, Inc., No. 7128 (Dec. 
20, 2011); Verified Class Action Complaint, Coyne v. RightNow Techs., Inc., No. 6996 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 28, 2011). 
 120. See Egelhof v. Szulik, No. 04 CVS 11746, 2008 WL 352668, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 
4, 2008) aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Egelhof ex rel. Red Hat, Inc. v. 
Szulik, 193 N.C. App. 612 (2008) (“While the size of ownership is not determinative of standing, a 
potential plaintiff’s lack of a real financial stake in the litigation is a warning sign that he or she may 
not be willing or able to devote the time necessary to fulfill the fiduciary obligations imposed by 
law on a shareholder derivative plaintiff.”). 
 121. I am relying on a small sample of cases here because shareholder plaintiffs are generally 
not required to disclose the number of shares that they own. Securities class actions are an 
exception because the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to disclose “all of the transactions of the plaintiff 
in the security that is the subject of the complaint during the class period specified in the 
complaint.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(iv) (2006).  
 122. For example, Mr. Kahn, who is referenced above, alleged in a complaint challenging the 
acquisition of 3Com Corporation that he owned 47,000 shares of stock in the company—a sizable 
amount under any definition. Verified Class Action Complaint, Kahn v. 3Com Corp., No. 5087, at 
2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 18, 2009); see also, e.g., Plaintiff Jean Marie Cinotto’s Declaration in Support of 
Motion for Lead Plaintiff and Appointment of Lead Counsel, Cinotto v. Kavanaugh, No. 2:08-cv-
01998-CWH, at 3 (D.S.C. July 17, 2008) (alleging that plaintiff and her husband owned 10,000 
shares in the target corporation).  
 123. E.g., Certification Pursuant to Federal Securities Laws, Ex. A to Shareholder Class Action 
Complaint, Pinchuck v. Termeer, No. 1:10-cv-11776, at 4 (D. Mass. Oct. 18, 2010) (stating that 
Mr. Pinchuck purchased 9 shares of stock in the target corporation during the class period); Mercier 
v. Inter-Tel Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 788 (Del. Ch. 2007) (stating that Mr. Mercier owned 100 shares of 
stock in the target corporation); Affidavit of Dan Himmel in Support of Moving Plaintiffs’ Motion 
to Appoint Lead Plaintiff, Lead Counsel, and Liason Counsel, Himmel v. Borne, No. 3:10-cv-
00441-BAJ-SCR, at ¶ 3 (M.D. La. July 2, 2010) (stating that Mr. Himmel owned 101 shares of 
stock in the target corporation). 
21
Erickson: The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder Litigation
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1110 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
Solectron Corporation, a case filed in the Superior Court of California.124 
In that case, the plaintiff Richard Carrigan challenged the proposed 
acquisition of Solectron Corporation by Flextronics International Ltd.125 
Mr. Carrigan may have business ties to Steven Staehr,126 the plaintiff who 
together with a relative filed more shareholder suits than nearly anyone else 
in my study.127 Mr. Carrigan was originally represented in the suit by the 
same law firm that represented the Staehrs in many of their cases.128  
Early in the litigation, the defendants suggested that Mr. Carrigan may 
have been paid for his involvement in the litigation. In their answer, they 
alleged that “[o]n information and belief, Richard Carrigan has received 
improper personal benefits through this lawsuit or through his prior service 
as a class representative in securities class action lawsuits or other 
relationships with plaintiff’s counsel or their affiliates.”129  
Later in the litigation, things changed. Mr. Carrigan became embroiled 
in a disagreement with his former law firm. This split prompted Mr. 
Carrigan to file a declaration in mid-2011 in which he alleged that his 
former law firm had sought to protect Steven Staehr at the expense of the 
shareholder class in the Solectron suit.130 In his declaration, Mr. Carrigan 
stated explicitly that he had “personal knowledge” that the law firm had 
paid Mr. Staehr “hundreds of thousands of dollars to act as a plaintiff in 
over 30 cases.”131 In short, the defendants accused Mr. Carrigan of being 
paid to serve in the Solectron lawsuit, and Mr. Carrigan accused Mr. Staehr 
                                                                                                                     
 124. Complaint Based on Self-Dealing and Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Carrigan v. Solectron 
Corporation, No. 1:07-cv-087219, at ¶ 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 4, 2007).  
 125. Id.  
 126. Mr. Carrigan and Mr. Staehr have invested in some of the same companies. By itself, this 
would not mean much. But these companies appear to be quite small, with stock that was not 
publicly traded at the time they originally invested, suggesting that the two may know each other. 
See, e.g., Grant Enterprises, Inc., Amendment No. 6 to Form SB-2, Registration Statement under 
the Securities Act of 1933, at 5–6 (Nov. 2, 2006) (disclosing that the company was controlled by 
Mr. Carrigan and had a total of forty-one investors, including Mr. Carrigan and Mr. Staehr); Eastern 
Services Holdings, Inc., Amendment No. 6 to Form SB-2, Registration Statement under the 
Securities Act of 1933 (Sept. 20, 2006) (disclosing that Mr. Carrigan was the sole employee of the 
main subsidiary of the company, which provides tax consultation to casinos, and that the company 
had only forty-one shareholders at that time, including Mr. Carrigan and Mr. Staehr).  
 127. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.  
 128. Compare Complaint Based upon Self-Dealing and Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Carrigan v. 
Solectron Corporation, No. 1:07-cv-087219, at 15 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 4, 2007) (identifying 
Robbins Umeda & Fink LLP as Mr. Carrigan’s counsel), with Docket, Staehr vs. Chizen, No. 1:06-
cv-072922 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2006) (identifying Robbins Umeda & Fink LLP as Mr. Staehr’s 
counsel).  
 129. Defendants’ Amended Answer to Revised Third Amended Complaint, Carrigan v. 
Solectron Corp., No. 1:07-cv-087219, at ¶ 60 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2009). 
 130. See id.     
 131. See Declaration of Richard Carrigan in Support of Plaintiff and Class Representative’s 
Response to Court’s Order to Show Cause, Carrigan v. Solectron Corp., No. 1:07-cv-087219, at 
¶¶ 1, 7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 2011).  
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of being paid to serve in other lawsuits.132 
The law firm vehemently denies both sets of allegations.133  In addition, 
the context of the dispute raises questions about the accuracy of Mr. 
Carrigan’s allegations. The law firm was in a dispute with the lawyer who 
had been Mr. Carrigan’s contact at the firm, and there appears to have been 
bad blood between the individuals involved. Nor did Mr. Carrigan explain 
in his declaration how he knew about the alleged payments to Mr. Staehr 
or offer supporting details. As a result, one cannot say with any certainty 
whether such payments in fact occurred. The allegations, however, 
certainly raise troubling questions.   
On the other side of the country, another public fight between attorneys 
has uncovered allegations of payments to plaintiffs. In 2011, two plaintiffs’ 
attorneys in New York sued a third plaintiffs’ attorney. The defendant was 
allegedly a so-called referral attorney, an attorney who refers shareholder 
plaintiffs to other lawyers who then perform much of the litigation work in 
the suits.134 The lawsuit concerned, among other things, the payment of 
these referral fees.135 During the legal battle, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
referral attorney had, without their knowledge, “paid [an individual] with 
the goal of inducing him to serve as a plaintiff.”136 The defendant denied 
this allegation, but the parties dismissed the case before the court could 
investigate these allegations.137  As in the Solectron litigation, it is 
impossible to know whether this plaintiff was in fact paid for participating 
in litigation, at least based on the public record alone. The point here is that 
there were allegations that such payments occurred and there was no 
judicial investigation of the allegations. 
The two cases above allege direct payments to plaintiffs. Other cases 
raise the possibility of indirect benefits. For example, some repeat 
plaintiffs are attorneys themselves whose practices may depend in part on 
referrals.138 Recall the Safety Kleen decision discussed above in Part I.139 In 
that pre-PSLRA decision, the court denied the plaintiff David 
Jaroslawicz’s motion to serve as class representative because he had served 
as co-counsel in dozens of cases with class counsel Pomerantz Levy.140 In 
other words, he was an inadequate class representative because he had a 
                                                                                                                     
 132. See id. 
 133. See Telephone Interview with Craig W. Smith, Robbins Arroyo LLP (Feb. 22, 2013). 
 134. First Amended Complaint, Jacobs v. Harris, No. 650637/2011, at ¶ 14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Apr. 22, 2011).  
 135. See id.at ¶ 29. 
 136. Id. at ¶ 10 (emphasis omitted).  
 137. See Dismissal Order with Prejudice, Jacobs et al. v. Harris, No. 650637/2011, at ¶ 3 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Sept. 6, 2011).  
 138. An even larger number of the plaintiffs are attorneys in shareholder lawsuits or related to 
attorneys in shareholder lawsuits. These attorneys are discussed separately in the next section.  
 139. See supra pp. 8–9.  
 140. Jaroslawicz v. Safety Kleen Corp., 151 F.R.D. 324, 330 (N.D. Ill. 1993).  
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significant business relationship with the law firm that was representing the 
class.141  
This decision was handed down nearly twenty years ago, but Mr. 
Jaroslawicz continues to serve as a plaintiff in shareholder lawsuits.142 
According to my research, he has served as a plaintiff in approximately a 
dozen shareholder lawsuits over the last ten years.143 His counsel in many 
of these suits is Pomerantz Haudek Grossman & Gross LLP,144 which 
appears to be related to the firm that represented Mr. Jaroslawicz in the 
Safety-Kleen litigation (Pomerantz Levy). It appears that Mr. Jaroslawicz 
still serves as co-counsel with Pomerantz Haudek Grossman & Gross LLP 
in other litigation.145 In other words, there is reason to believe that a 
relationship similar to the one that concerned the court back in 1993 still 
exists. As we shall see, the same can be said for other problems identified 
in the pre-1995 period.  
B.  Lawyers and Their Families as Plaintiffs 
A second category of professional plaintiffs involves the use of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and their families as plaintiffs. This Section presents 
empirical data on the use of these plaintiffs and then turns to specific 
examples that illustrate the phenomenon.  
1.  Empirical Data 
To find plaintiffs’ attorneys who have served as plaintiffs, I first 
                                                                                                                     
 141. Id. 
 142. For a sampling of these cases, see Summons, Jaroslawicz v. Transatlantic Holdings, Inc., 
No. 651718/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 21, 2011); Jaroslawicz v. Hambrick, No. 1:1-cv-000886 
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 6, 2011); Abramoff v. Pien, Case No. RG05232060 (Ca. Super. Ct. Sept. 
12, 2005). In addition, a plaintiff who appears to be his wife has also filed multiple lawsuits. See, 
e.g., Nadoff v. Medco Health Solutions, No. 2:11-cv-04248 (D.N.J. July 22, 2011); Nadoff (as 
custodian for Michael Seth Jaroslawicz) v. Wolford, No. CGC-10-505737 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 
2010); Nadoff v. McDaniel, No. 08116438 (Dec. 9, 2008). In at least one of these suits, her 
husband is listed as one of the attorneys representing the putative class. See, e.g., Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial, Nadoff v. Medco Health Solutions, No. 2:11-cv-04248, at 20 (D.N.J. July 
22, 2011) (listing David Jaroslawicz as an attorney).  
 143. See id.  
 144. See Complaint, Jaroslawicz v. Transatlantic Holdings, Inc., No. 651718/2011, at 18 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. June 21, 2011) (listing Pomerantz Haudek as counsel); Shareholder Class Action 
Complaint, Jaroslawicz v. Lavin, No. 1:10-cv-06815, at 22 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2010). The firm is 
now called Pomerantz Grossman Hufford Dahlstrom & Gross LLP. 
 145. See Class Action Complaint, Spataro v. Lincoln Nat’l Corp., No. 11-cv-2035, at 14 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2011) (ERISA class action complaint listing both Pomerantz Haudek Grossman 
& Gross LLP and Jaroslawicz & Jaros LLC as counsel); Class Action Complaint, CLAL Finance 
Mutual Fund Mgmt., Ltd. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 10-cv-8392, at 23 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
2010) (Commodity Exchange Act complaint listing same two firms, among others, as counsel); 
Class Action Complaint, Randolph-Rand Corp. v. YKK Corp., No. 07-cv-10324–DC, at 18 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2007) (antitrust class action complaint listing same two firms as counsel). 
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identified law firms that regularly represent plaintiffs in shareholder 
litigation.146 I then searched for the names of the attorneys at these firms in 
the Dockets database in Westlaw. This search revealed more than fifty 
cases in which plaintiffs’ attorneys appear to have served as plaintiffs 
between 2002 and 2012.147  
Much more difficult is identifying plaintiffs’ lawyers’ family members 
who have served as plaintiffs. Lawyers do not typically make their family 
trees available online (with one notable exception described below). As a 
result, I uncovered cases involving family members largely by chance.148 
Still, my research reveals approximately fifty more shareholder lawsuits 
since 2002 brought by plaintiffs who appear to be family members of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys. Whether these suits are only a drop in a much larger 
bucket is unclear. At a minimum, however, plaintiffs’ attorneys or family 
members of plaintiffs’ attorneys appear to have filed more than 100 
lawsuits since 2002.  
Should this phenomenon disturb us? Some may argue that there is 
nothing wrong with these attorneys or their family members serving as 
plaintiffs. After all, attorneys can be victims of corporate misconduct, and 
they should be able to use the legal system to redress their harms. Indeed, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are presumably more likely to recognize corporate 
misconduct because they battle against it every day. And they are more 
familiar with the litigation process and therefore may be able to provide 
better oversight of the litigation. 
Even so, there is reason to be skeptical. As courts have long recognized, 
shareholder plaintiffs are supposed to serve as an independent check on the 
litigation, ensuring that the lawsuit is in the best interests of the corporation 
and its shareholders.149  It is obviously difficult to perform this role when 
the attorney is one’s spouse or close family member.150 Similarly, an 
attorney plaintiff who routinely works as co-counsel with the other 
                                                                                                                     
 146. I generated this list through my own knowledge and research of this area. As with the 
previous section, my goal was to explore the problem, not present a definitive count. As a result, the 
actual scope of the problem may be greater than these figures reflect.  
 147. As in the previous Section, these plaintiffs played varied roles in the litigation. In some 
instances, they served as the lead plaintiffs and therefore had a high degree of control over the 
litigation. In other cases, they played smaller roles in the litigation.  
 148. In gathering the data on repeat plaintiffs described above, I often came across plaintiffs 
whose last names I recognized. Using publicly available information, I was able to confirm whether 
these plaintiffs were related to plaintiffs’ attorneys.  
 149. See, e.g., Stull v. Poole, 63 F.R.D. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).  
 150. It is difficult to determine the precise details of the representations from the public record. 
In some cases, the attorney relative serves as an attorney of record in the suit. In other cases, 
however, the attorney relative is not listed as an attorney of record. In these cases, the exact 
arrangements are unclear. If the attorney simply refers his relative to another lawyer with no 
expectation of payment or future referrals, there may be no reason for concern. On the other hand, if 
the attorney works on the suit but is not listed as counsel of record or if the attorney is compensated 
through direct payments or the hope of future business, there may be greater reason for concern.  
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attorneys in the litigation may be unwilling to jeopardize his business 
relationships by taking a strong position in litigation. In short, these 
attorney plaintiffs face possible conflicts of interest that may make it 
difficult for them to properly represent absent class members.151  
2.  Illustrative Examples 
Several examples illustrate this practice. The first involves a law firm 
based in New York City called Paskowitz & Associates. Laurence 
Paskowitz is the named partner at the firm, and he often serves as an 
attorney in shareholder lawsuits.152 Over the last several years, however, 
Mr. Paskowitz has also served as a plaintiff in multiple shareholder 
lawsuits.153 Mr. Paskowitz is represented in some of these suits by an 
attorney named Roy Jacobs.154 Mr. Jacobs’ office is on the same floor of 
the same office building as Paskowitz & Associates,155 and Mr. Jacobs is 
listed as part of Mr. Paskowitz’s firm in several court filings.156 In other 
words, Mr. Paskowitz is both a plaintiffs’ lawyer and a plaintiff, often 
represented by a close business associate. 
For other attorneys, litigation is a family affair. Jules Brody is a partner 
at Stull, Stull & Brody, a plaintiffs’ firm with offices in New York City 
and California.157 Mr. Brody is married to Adele Brody,158 who has filed 
                                                                                                                     
 151. This does not mean that any particular lawyer is an inadequate shareholder plaintiff. It 
simply means that these plaintiffs may merit additional scrutiny. As discussed below, such scrutiny 
rarely occurs.  
 152. See, e.g., LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/pub/laurence-paskowitz/9/720/795 (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2012) (stating that he specializes in class actions, antitrust litigation, consumer fraud, 
and complex business litigation and arbitration).  
 153. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Paskowitz v. Dayton Power & Light, No. 20:11-cv-
03103-GAB (Ohio Ct. C.P. Apr. 27, 2011); Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Paskowitz v. 
Zenith Nat’l Ins. Corp., No. BC432177 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2010); Complaint, Paskowitz v. 
Pacific Capital Bancorp, No. 09-cv-6449 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2009); Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order, Paskowitz v. Toro, No. 2110-N (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2006). In my conversations 
with Mr. Paskowitz, he stated that he was not the lead plaintiff in many of these cases. See Email to 
Jessica Erickson from Laurence Paskowitz (Feb. 10, 2011) (on file with author). 
 154. See, e.g., Letter from Roy L. Jacobs to United States District Court, Paskowitz v. Pac. 
Capital Bank Corp., No. 2:09-cv-6449 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2010) (identifying himself as one of Mr. 
Paskowitz’s attorneys in the shareholder suit); Class Action Complaint, Paskowitz v. Looney, No. 
1:07-cv-01053 (D. Col. May 18, 2007) (Mr. Jacobs identified as “of counsel” for Mr. Paskowitz).  
 155. See, e.g., Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Delman v. Gifford, No. 11-cv-
6749, at 59 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011) (stating, on the signature page, that both Mr. Paskowitz and 
Mr. Jacobs work on the forty-sixth floor of 60 East 42nd Street in New York City).  
 156. See, e.g., Verified Class Action Complaint, Case No. 6090, DeHorn v. Soran, (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 21, 2010), at 13; Berlin v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Assoc., Case No. 09-6928 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 
23, 2009), at 31.  In my discussions with Mr. Paskowitz, he told me that they each own their own 
law firms, but that Mr. Paskowitz hires Mr. Jacobs to serve as “of counsel” to Mr. Paskowitz’s firm 
for particular cases. See Email to Jessica Erickson from Laurence Paskowitz (Feb. 10, 2011) (on file 
with author). 
 157. See Brief Biography of Stull, Stull & Brody, at 17, http://www.ssbny.com/wp-
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multiple shareholder lawsuits over the past ten years.159 Indeed, Mrs. Brody 
was identified as one of the “Most Frequently Named Plaintiffs” in a 2004 
study of shareholder lawsuits filed in Delaware.160 This fact alone may 
raise concerns, but my research suggests that multiple other members of 
Mr. Brody’s family have filed shareholder lawsuits as well. I have included 
below Mr. Brody’s family tree, which the family made public on the 
Internet.161 The shaded boxes represent the individuals in his family who 
have filed shareholder suits or other class action litigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As this figure illustrates, Mr. Brody’s wife, son, son-in-law, and daughter-
in-law appear to have served as plaintiffs in shareholder lawsuits or related 
lawsuits.162 In addition, Mr. Brody’s wife Adele has apparently sued on 
                                                                                                                     
content/uploads/2012/03/SSBBio2-22-12.pdf. 
 158. See Marriage Announcement, Jules Brody to Marry Adele Nussbacher, N.Y. TIMES 
Oct. 17, 1965, available at http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F60710FC3454177A93
C5A8178BD95F418685F9.  
 159. See, e.g., In re Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc., S’holders Litig., No. 3205-CC (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 4, 2007); Brody v. Catell, No. 0008835/2006 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 19, 2006); Brody v. 
Bellsouth Corp., No. 1:02-cv-02283 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 16, 2002). 
 160. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 94, at 188.  
 161. This genealogy information was available online. See Selected Families & Individuals, 
http://www.rabbiyehudahyudelrosenberg.com/. When I contacted the law firm to confirm this 
information, this portion of the website was taken down. A copy of the page that was taken down is 
on file with the author.  
 162. Ms. Weisman appears to have served as a plaintiff in one or more antitrust class actions. 
See Weisman v. Hearst Corp., No. 1:00-cv-05316 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2000); Weisman v. Nine West 
Group, Inc., No. 7:99-cv-00394 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1999).  
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behalf of her mother’s estate in at least one lawsuit.163 She has also served 
as the custodian for her two minor grandchildren in multiple lawsuits.164 
The lawsuits involving the two grandchildren are interesting. I was able 
to locate the complaints for two of these suits.165 Both suits appear to have 
been filed when the children were less than five years old.166 The only 
reference to their minor status that I could locate came in the certifications 
attached at the end of the complaints where Adele Brody (their 
grandmother) is identified as their custodian.167 Also notable is the fact 
that, according to the certifications, the children owned only 100 shares of 
stock in the defendant corporations.168 The certifications also disclosed that 
the children were repeat litigants, having served or sought to serve as lead 
plaintiffs in a total of six other lawsuits in the prior three years.169 In some 
of these cases, one of the children appears to be represented by her family’s 
law firm.170  
Are these plaintiffs proper representatives of the class? The short 
answer is that no one knows. As explained in greater detail below,171 
defense attorneys and judges typically conduct remarkably little research 
into the background of shareholder plaintiffs. As a result, they typically do 
not notice that the plaintiff is a plaintiffs’ attorney or related to a plaintiffs’ 
attorney. In other words, it is difficult to know whether these plaintiffs are 
proper class representatives because no one is asking the right questions.  
                                                                                                                     
 163. Residuary Estate v. El Paso Corp., No. 4:02-cv-02838 (S.D. Tex. July 25, 2002). 
 164. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, Rubin v. 
Am. Express, No. 1:02-cv-06440 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2002) [hereinafter American Express 
Complaint]; Brody v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, No. 1:02-cv-2385 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2002); Class 
Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, Yaish v. Oracle Corp., No. 3:01-cv-
01237 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2001). 
 165. See Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, Rubin v. Am. 
Express Co., No. 1:02-cv-6440 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2002); Class Action Complaint for Violations 
of Federal Securities Laws, Brody v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 02-cv-2385 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 
2002) [hereinafter Bristol Complaint].  
 166. According to the family’s website one of the grandchildren was born in 1999 and another 
was born in 1998. See Selected Families & Individuals, supra note 161. The two cases in question 
were filed in 2002.  
 167. See Bristol Complaint, Plaintiff Certification (attached at back); American Express 
Complaint, Plaintiff Certification (attached at back). It is unclear why their grandmother, as 
opposed to their parents, is listed as their custodian.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. See, e.g., Smilow v. J.P. Morgan Chase, No. 1:02-cv-01910-SHS (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 
2002) (indicating on the docket that the plaintiff was represented by Aaron, her father; and Jules 
Brody, her  grandfather); DeltaThree.com IPO v. DeltaThree.Com, Inc., No. 1:01-cv-05425 
(S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2001) (indicating, on the docket, that the plaintiff was represented by Aaron, her 
father; Tzivia, her aunt; and Jules Brody, her grandfather). 
 171. See discussion infra Subsection II.D.3. 
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C.  Entities as Plaintiffs 
Institutional plaintiffs can fly under the judicial radar even more easily 
than individuals can. It is remarkably easy to set up a corporation or other 
business entity. 172 Plaintiffs who want to avoid scrutiny as repeat plaintiffs 
can set up multiple companies and divide their investments among them. 
This Section explores the possibility that attorneys may be using such 
entities as plaintiffs. This Section does not include empirical data because 
one cannot reach definitive conclusions about specific institutions based on 
publicly available information. Instead, this Section relies largely on 
illustrative examples.  
1.  Illustrative Examples 
A recent case from the Delaware Court of Chancery, In re SS & C 
Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, highlights the possibility that 
individuals may have created entities at least in part to serve as plaintiffs in 
shareholder lawsuits. The case was an acquisition class action arising out 
of the sale of SS & C Technologies, Inc., brought by an institutional 
plaintiff called Paulena Partners.173 During the litigation, counsel for the 
plaintiffs informed the defendants that the complaint had incorrectly 
identified Paulena Partners as the plaintiff, when in fact the actual SS&C 
stockholder was another entity called Bamboo Partners.174 Both Paulena 
Partners and Bamboo Partners were managed by a man named Dean 
Drulias.175  
This disclosure prompted the defendants to depose Mr. Drulias. During 
the deposition, they learned that Mr. Drulias had had an interest in 
numerous partnerships, as the Figure below illustrates.176  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 172. In most states, an individual only needs to file simple paperwork with the state and pay a 
nominal fee. As a recent Reuters investigation found, many states even allow the real owners of 
corporations to hide behind nominal officers and directors who have little or no role in the company 
and who are often executives of the mass incorporator. See Kelly Carr & Brian Grow, Special 
Report: A Little House of Secrets on the Great Plains, REUTERS, June 28, 2011, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/28/us-usa-shell-companies-idUSTRE75R20Z20110628. 
Reuters uncovered, for example, a single house in Cheyenne, Wyoming, where more than 2000 
companies are registered, serving as “a little Cayman Island on the Great Plains.” Id. The Reuters 
investigation highlights how easy it is for individuals to hide behind corporate entities.  
 173. In re SS & C Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 948 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. Ch. 2008).  
 174. Id. at 1144.  
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. Some of the partnerships in this Figure were actually the same entity because, as Mr. 
Drulias testified, he changed the name of these partnerships when he took over management of 
them. Id. n.13. 
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Each of these partnerships owned a few shares of stock in between sixty 
and eighty public companies.177 According to the court, these interests 
meant that “at any given time [Mr. Drulias had] a minuscule, indirect 
interest in several hundred publicly traded companies.”178 In total, these 
partnerships filed at least thirty shareholder class actions, although Mr. 
Drulias could not remember the exact number in his deposition.179 He was 
represented in many of these lawsuits by the Brualdi Law Firm, a repeat 
player in the world of shareholder litigation.180  
The court was extremely critical of these partnerships. It noted that Mr. 
Drulias had made a number of false statements in court filings, and these 
misstatements “are easily susceptible to the inference” that they were 
intended to conceal a “web of partnerships.”181 The court also noted that 
the purpose of these partnerships may have been to “spawn[]” litigation.182 
The court held that these misstatements demonstrated a “pattern of, at best, 
                                                                                                                     
 177.Id. at 1144. 
 178. Id. Bamboo Partnerships owned three shares of stock in SS & C. Id. Mr. Drulias testified 
that he owned approximately 2% of these entities, often indirectly through other entities. He was 
not asked who owned the remaining 98%, and there is no public information available on this point. 
See id. 
 179. Id. at 1145. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
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carelessness, and at worst, a deliberate effort to mislead the court.”183 The 
court then imposed sanctions on the plaintiff.184 
2.  Extent of These Practices 
The SS&C example raises disturbing questions, but the critical issue is 
whether the problems are more widespread. Limited to publicly available 
information, it is impossible to know. Yet there is reason to wonder about 
at least some plaintiffs in these suits.  
First, we know remarkably little about many of the institutions that 
serve as plaintiffs in shareholder litigation. A significant percentage of 
shareholder suits are filed on behalf of institutions.185 Many of these 
institutions are public pension or labor funds, but others are not. In my own 
data set, there are a significant number of cases filed by institutions with 
names suggesting that they may be private investment partnerships or 
similar financial institutions. In researching these entities, I discovered that 
little information is available about at least some of them. Most disclose 
nothing about themselves in the court records.186 Many have no Internet 
presence whatsoever. In some instances, the chief information available 
online about the entities is the many lawsuits filed in their names.187 In an 
era when Google can give us information about almost anything, some of 
these entities appear to be invisible—except, that is, in the courtroom.  
This is not to suggest that these entities are illegitimate. The law allows 
private investment vehicles to remain largely private. Yet this invisibility 
means that we know remarkably little about many of the institutions that 
file shareholder suits, and in light of the SS & C decision, this lack of 
knowledge may be problematic.  
Moreover, no one appears to be investigating these entities. In 
researching this Article, I spoke with numerous defense attorneys about 
their experiences in shareholder litigation. They told me that they conduct 
very little research about the named plaintiffs.188 In fact, unless they have a 
                                                                                                                     
 183. Id. at 1151. 
 184. The court held that the plaintiff acted in bad faith during the litigation. It based this 
decision in large part on the plaintiff’s motion to withdraw from the litigation without giving notice 
to the class in order to keep the alleged issues with these partnerships private. Id. at 1151–52.  
 185. See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 21, at 1766–67 (finding that one-third of shareholder 
derivative suits filed in federal court between mid-2005 and mid-2006 were filed by institutions). 
 186. Plaintiffs in shareholder lawsuits typically disclose only their names, the fact that they 
owned stock in the target corporation during the time in question, and (if necessary for diversity 
jurisdiction) their states of citizenship. Other details—such as the general nature of their businesses 
or the names of their owners—are not disclosed until discovery. If the case does not get to 
discovery (and most do not), this information may never be disclosed. See id. at 1765. 
 187. This discussion does not identify specific entities because it is impossible to tell from the 
public record whether specific entities are legitimate. The purpose of this discussion is instead to 
highlight broader questions about the use of institutions as plaintiffs.  
 188. This point is illustrated by the SS & C litigation itself. No one would have ever known 
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specific reason to suspect misconduct or the case is quite significant, they 
typically conduct “zero” investigation into these plaintiffs.189  
Why do defense attorneys fail to ask even the most basic questions 
about these plaintiffs? Defense attorneys told me that this decision stems 
from two considerations. First, and most importantly, professional 
plaintiffs often appear in acquisition class actions, and these suits move 
extremely quickly. There are often only a few months between the filing of 
the litigation and the scheduled closing of the merger. During this brief 
window, defense attorneys devote all of their energies to ensuring that the 
merger closes on schedule. As a result, they often focus on litigation 
strategies that will lead to a quick settlement or a blanket dismissal. 
Challenging the adequacy of the plaintiff is unlikely to accomplish either 
goal, at least in the eyes of defense attorneys.190  
Second, defense attorneys may be naïve about the identity of 
shareholder plaintiffs. They might suspect that plaintiffs may own only a 
few shares of stock in the target corporation or may not know much about 
the underlying litigation, but the defense attorneys do not think that there 
are more serious problems. Their beliefs may even be self-perpetuating. 
Defense attorneys do not research plaintiffs because they do not think they 
will find anything useful, and they do not think they will find anything 
useful because they have never researched the plaintiffs. In short, we do 
not know what types of entities serve as plaintiffs in shareholder litigation 
because no one is asking the question. 
D.  Dead Plaintiffs and Other Problems from the Filing Graveyard 
The problems outlined above are quite reminiscent of the problems that 
preceded the PSLRA. My research suggests, however, that new problems 
may have emerged in the wake of the PSLRA. This Section highlights 
three new types of alleged problems relating to the plaintiffs in shareholder 
litigation: (1) plaintiffs who may have died during the litigation, (2) 
plaintiffs who may not have owned the required stock during the litigation, 
and (3) plaintiffs who may not have known that they were plaintiffs. As 
with the prior Section, limited to allegations in the public record, it is not 
possible to present empirical data showing how often these problems have 
occurred. Thus, the discussion below relies on illustrative allegations to 
                                                                                                                     
that Dean Drulias was associated with entities involved in approximately thirty lawsuits if he had 
not accidentally offered up the wrong entity as the plaintiff.  
 189. These attorneys often conduct more research in higher-profile or higher-dollar value 
cases. As discussed further in Part III, these cases are different than the more typical cases that are 
the focus of this Article.  
 190. These attorneys may believe that plaintiffs’ attorneys will merely substitute a new plaintiff 
if the original plaintiff comes under fire. This belief may not always be correct, because the 
plaintiffs’ attorney may not be able to find another shareholder willing to serve as a plaintiff in the 
suit. In many suits, however, there is more than one plaintiff, and therefore disqualifying one 
plaintiff would not eliminate the entire suit.  
32
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/2
2013] THE NEW PROFESSSIONAL PLAINTIFFS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 1121 
 
raise broader questions about the practices in these suits.  
1.  Dead Plaintiffs 
In at least two cases, litigation may have continued for several months 
after the death of the shareholder plaintiff. The first case is a shareholder 
derivative suit filed by a shareholder named Maxine Babus on November 
3, 2006.191 This lawsuit, which was filed on behalf of Loral Space & 
Communications Inc. in New York state court, alleged that the Loral board 
breached its fiduciary duties in connection with the sale of $300 million of 
preferred stock.192 On March 21, 2007, months after the suit was filed, the 
parties entered into a Memorandum of Understanding in which the 
purchaser of the preferred stock agreed to pay Loral to settle the 
litigation.193  
On April 27, 2007, according to the company’s public filings, the 
plaintiffs in a parallel Delaware suit filed a motion to intervene in the New 
York suit.194 In this motion, the interveners told the court that the New 
York shareholder plaintiff, Maxine Babus, had died on November 12, 
2006, just days after the suit was filed.195 According to these court filings, 
the attorneys were ready to settle the case even though they did not have a 
named plaintiff.  
My research uncovered another case in which the plaintiff’s death may 
not have been disclosed to the court for several months. In Orton v. Brown, 
the plaintiff, J. Robert Orton Jr., filed a shareholder derivative suit on 
behalf of MBIA Inc. in the Southern District of New York.196 The suit was 
filed on April 24, 2006.197 More than a year later, on May 1, 2007, the 
defendants filed a Suggestion of Death informing the court that the 
plaintiff had died.198 No additional information was provided, and the suit 
was voluntarily dismissed several months later.199 My own research 
suggests that Mr. Orton may have died in May 2006, approximately two 
weeks after the suit was filed.200 If this research is correct, Mr. Orton’s 
                                                                                                                     
 191. See Babus v. Targoff, No. 603842/2006 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 3, 2006).  
 192. See Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Babus v. Targoff, No. 603842/2006 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Nov. 3, 2006).  
 193. See Loral Space &  Commc’ns Inc., Form 10-Q, at 27 (for the quarterly period that ended 
Sept. 30, 2007).  
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. 
 196. Orton v. Brown, No. 1:06-cv-03146 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006).  
 197.  Id. 
 198. See Suggestion of Death Upon the Record, Orton v. Brown, No. 1:06-cv-03146 
(S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2007). 
 199. See Stipulation and Order of Dismissal, Orton v. Brown, No. 1:06-cv-03146-LLS 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2007). 
 200. See Social Security Death Index for J. Robert Orton, ANCESTRY.COM, 
http://www.ancestry.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2012) (stating that he died on May 10, 2006). This 
33
Erickson: The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder Litigation
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1122 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
death was not brought to the court’s attention for nearly twelve months,.201  
A dead plaintiff is obviously unable to serve as an advocate for the 
plaintiff corporation or absent class members. One could say the same 
about other plaintiffs who do not meet the basic qualifications to file these 
suits.  
2.  Plaintiffs Who May Not Own Stock 
Plaintiffs lack standing to file shareholder litigation if they do not own 
the required stock in the target corporation. In shareholder derivative suits, 
a shareholder is only permitted to file suit on behalf of the plaintiff 
corporation if the shareholder owned stock in the target corporation at the 
time of the alleged misconduct and continued to hold this stock throughout 
the litigation.202 This requirement is based in large part on the principle 
that derivative plaintiffs represent the company, and therefore should have 
financial interests that are aligned with the company’s interests.203 
Some plaintiffs, however, may have filed derivative suits even though 
they could not comply with this basic requirement. In Parfi Holding AB v. 
Mirror Image Internet, Inc.,204 for example, the court discovered that two 
of the plaintiffs no longer held stock in the plaintiff corporation.205 Indeed, 
one of the plaintiffs had divested its stock in the plaintiff corporation 
nearly six years earlier, before the litigation was even filed.206 The 
plaintiff’s counsel may have ignored this fact or failed to inquire whether 
the plaintiff met the requirements to serve as a derivative plaintiff.  
This problem may be more widespread.  Shareholders in derivative 
suits must allege continuous stock ownership from the time of the alleged 
misconduct through the conclusion of the suit. Shareholders often satisfy 
this pleading requirement by alleging that they are and were, “at all 
relevant times,” a shareholder of the plaintiff corporation.207 In many suits, 
however, the allegations are slightly different. Instead of alleging that the 
                                                                                                                     
obituary does not specify that this decedent was J. Robert Orton Jr., although other information 
suggests that he was. See, e.g., Obituary, Robert Orton Jr., CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 23, 2006 
(referencing the death of J. Robert Orton Jr. in La Jolla, California on May 10, 2006).  
 201. See, e.g., Memo. of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Orton v. Brown, No. 1:06-cv-
03146 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2006); Plaintiff’s Initial Disclosures Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a), 
Orton v. Brown, No. 1:06-cv-03146 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2007).  
 202. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2011). 
 203. See Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 954 A.2d 911, 939 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 935–38.  
 206. Id. at 935. 
 207. See, e.g., Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Salzman v. Bartz, No. 11-cv-03269, at ¶ 18 
(N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011). Many courts have required the plaintiff to go even further; they have 
required the plaintiff to specifically identify when he or shepurchased stock in the plaintiff 
corporation and whether he or she continues to own this stock. See, e.g., In re VeriSign, Inc., 
Derivative Litig., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1202 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
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plaintiff owned stock “at all relevant times”208 to the litigation or providing 
the details of their stock purchases and sales, plaintiffs often allege only 
that they owned stock “at times relevant” to the litigation.209This difference 
may simply reflect a drafting choice, but given Parfi Holding, there is 
certainly an argument that more should be done to confirm the plaintiff’s 
stock holdings in derivative litigation.  
3.  Plaintiffs Who May Not Know They Are Plaintiffs 
Among the most troubling allegations are those regarding plaintiffs who 
may not know they are plaintiffs.  One recent lawsuit raises the possibility 
that a lawsuit may have been filed on a plaintiff’s behalf without her 
knowledge or consent.  In this 2010 lawsuit, two plaintiffs’ attorneys in 
New York City filed a lawsuit against a referral attorney who they alleged 
“supplied” them with a plaintiff who had not consented to participate in the 
litigation.210 Not knowing about the plaintiff’s lack of consent, the 
attorneys filed suit on the plaintiff’s behalf in federal court.211 Following 
the filing of the case, a reporter allegedly located the plaintiff and phoned 
her for comment.212 The complaint alleges that the plaintiff then “learned 
that [the referral attorney] had volunteered her to serve as a plaintiff 
without her knowledge.”213 The suit was subsequently dismissed. The 
attorneys note that the referral attorney’s alleged “strategy would ‘work’ in 
the vast majority of derivative cases, as the named plaintiff is only rarely 
subjected to any sort of personal discovery.”214 Had the reporter not 
contacted the plaintiff, it is certainly possible that the suit would have 
continued without the knowledge or participation of a named plaintiff.  
How often do such problems occur? When it comes to professional 
plaintiffs, empirical evidence is hard to come by. Anecdotal evidence sheds 
light on this corner of the legal system, but attorneys and judges are not 
asking the tough questions that could lead to broader insights. As a result, 
we do not know how often shareholders are being paid to participate in 
litigation. We do not know how often plaintiffs’ lawyers are serving as 
plaintiffs themselves. We do not know if institutional plaintiffs are 
legitimate entities. We do not even know if plaintiffs are named in 
                                                                                                                     
 208. Shareholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 207. 
 209. A search of the pleadings database in Westlaw reveals some of these complaints. For 
example, a search for “derivative & (plaintiff /15 (owner or holder) /15 (stock or shares) /15 “at 
times relevant”)” brings up more than 300 examples of this type of language in derivative 
complaints. It is impossible to determine from the public record which of these plaintiffs, if any, fail 
to satisfy the standing requirements. 
 210. See First Amended Complaint, Jacobs  v. Harris, No. 650637/2011, at ¶ 18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Apr. 22, 2011).  
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. ¶ 19.  
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. ¶ 18. 
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litigation without their knowledge. In all of these instances, no one ever 
bothers to check. And because no one ever bothers to check, there is a 
window of opportunity for unscrupulous lawyers who are willing to skirt 
the rules to procure a client.  
III.  TOWARD A NEW PROFESSIONALISM IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
In corporate law, it seems, the more things change, the more they stay 
the same. Many of the exact practices that Congress targeted in the 1990s 
may be continuing in the state courts. As these practices are exposed, 
lawmakers must again confront the theoretical questions that accompany 
these practices. When Congress passed the PSLRA, many commentators 
asked whether professional plaintiffs hurt anyone215—a question that is 
still critical today. This Part explains why the new professional plaintiffs 
are bad for corporate law. The discussion begins by exploring the ethical 
implications of professional plaintiffs. It then shifts to a broader 
examination of the impact of professional plaintiffs on investors and 
entrepreneurial litigation more generally. Finally, this Part considers new 
legislative proposals to address the problem of professional plaintiffs.  
A.  The Problems with the New Professional Plaintiffs 
1.  Lax Ethics 
The allegations outlined in Part II are undoubtedly troubling and 
perhaps even scandalous. Few would argue in favor of a legal system in 
which lawyers surreptitiously pay plaintiffs to lend their names to litigation 
or sue on behalf of their family members. Beyond the shock value, 
however, some of the allegations in Part II may implicate the ethical rules 
that govern the practice of law.216 The use of professional plaintiffs may 
raise two specific ethical concerns.  
First, ethics rules prohibit payments to shareholder plaintiffs beyond 
their pro rata share of the recovery and reimbursement of reasonable 
expenses. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) 
provide that a lawyer may not share legal fees with a nonlawyer except in 
certain narrow circumstances.217 A lawyer also cannot provide financial 
                                                                                                                     
 215. This was a common question, for example, in the wake of the Milberg Weiss indictments 
when the government alleged that the law firm had paid plaintiffs. See, e.g., Lonny Hoffman & Alan 
F. Steinberg, The Ongoing Milberg Weiss Controversy, 30 REV. LITIG. 183, 186 (2011) (“The single 
greatest source of controversy surrounding the Milberg prosecution, however, has always been 
whether anyone was actually harmed by what the lawyers did.”). 
 216. This discussion is meant to highlight possible ethical problems with the use of 
professional plaintiffs. It does not mean that any attorneys have violated their ethical obligations, 
much less that any particular attorneys have violated their ethical obligations. Such a determination 
would depend on the specific facts in each case, many of which are not available from the public 
record.  
 217. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4. These rules do not prohibit payments that 
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assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated 
litigation.218 In short, if attorneys are paying plaintiffs to participate in 
litigation, they may be violating their ethical obligations.219  
Second, ethical issues arise if attorneys make false statements to the 
court. The Model Rules provide that an attorney may not make a false 
statement of fact or law to the court.220 Depending on their precise 
representations to the court, attorneys may violate this rule when they 
represent professional plaintiffs.  
These ethical concerns about the use of professional plaintiffs have a 
critical impact on the application of class action law. The legal system 
requires judges to determine whether the proposed class representative is 
an adequate representative of the class.221 In a shareholder lawsuit, this 
determination depends in large part on whether the named plaintiffs have 
interests that conflict with the interests of other class members.222 Such a 
conflict impedes the ability of plaintiffs to perform their “most important 
task”—selecting and supervising class counsel to ensure that they are 
acting in accordance with the interests of the class.223  
The use of professional plaintiffs has direct implications under the laws 
governing class actions. If plaintiffs have been paid to participate in 
litigation, for example, their interests likely diverge from the interests of 
the class. These plaintiffs may be more concerned with protecting their 
side payments than with maximizing the recovery to the class, especially if 
the side payments exceed the plaintiffs’ likely recovery in the litigation.224 
These concerns would take on even more significance if the plaintiff is 
dead, nonexistent, or does not know that he or she has been named in the 
suit.  
Despite these concerns, the law lacks an effective mechanism to enforce 
existing rules. It is theoretically possible for lawyers to be disbarred for 
violating their ethical obligations, but in most cases this possibility is 
merely theoretical. Lawyers typically only face ethics proceedings if the 
alleged violation is referred to the state bar association. Named plaintiffs 
are unlikely to make such a referral, especially if they are being paid for 
                                                                                                                     
compensate plaintiffs for their expenses in the litigation.  
 218. Id. R. 1.8(e). 
 219. These payments may also violate federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (making it a 
criminal offense to “corruptly demand[], seek[], receive[], accept[], or agree[] to receive or accept 
anything of value . . . in return for being influenced in testimony under oath or affirmation as a 
witness”). 
 220. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1). 
 221. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). A similar requirement applies to shareholder derivative suits 
under Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
 222. See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
 223. Gill v. Monroe Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 92 F.R.D. 14, 16 (W.D.N.Y. 1981).  
 224. A similar concern arises if class counsel uses his or her family members or business 
associates as plaintiffs. 
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their cooperation or are related to class counsel. The defendant could refer 
a case to disciplinary authorities, but as discussed above, defendants 
typically conduct little or no investigation into the shareholder plaintiff. 
Moreover, the defendant may prefer an inadequate plaintiff because it may 
be able to bargain for a lower settlement if the plaintiff is vulnerable to 
challenge.  
Absent the plaintiff or the defendant raising these ethical issues, the 
court is unlikely to discover them. Few courts conduct their own inquiries 
into the background of the named plaintiffs, at least beyond a few cursory 
questions directed at counsel. Issues may arise through mere happenstance 
during the course of the litigation, as in many of the allegations discussed 
in Part II, but most cases will escape judicial scrutiny.225  
This analysis does not mean that defendants never contest the 
qualifications of the named plaintiff. In larger cases with significant money 
at stake, the defendant has a greater incentive to oppose class certification 
by investigating the named plaintiff’s qualifications. As discussed in the 
next Section, however, the problems identified in this Article do not 
typically arise in these larger cases. Instead, these problems arise more 
often in the run-of-the-mill cases that settle at minimal cost to the 
defendants. In these cases, defendants have little incentive to challenge the 
adequacy of the plaintiff and the court has little incentive to delay the 
settlement by conducting its own investigation.226  
In sum, ethical and other rules may prohibit many of the practices 
associated with professional plaintiffs. The problem is that there is not an 
effective means to enforce these rules. As we shall see, without a means to 
enforce these rules, there is no one at the settlement table to protect the 
interests of absent class members.  
2.  Missing Monitors  
Plaintiffs have always occupied an uneasy role in entrepreneurial 
litigation. On one hand, attorneys cannot file a shareholder derivative suit 
or acquisition class action without a named plaintiff.227 On the other hand, 
                                                                                                                     
 225. The same problems come into play during class certification. In the vast majority of cases, 
the court does not certify the class until after the parties have reached a settlement. In the settlement 
documents, the parties typically agree that the named plaintiff is an adequate representative and that 
the case otherwise satisfied the requirements of Rule 23. The prevalence of these settlement-only 
classes means that most named plaintiffs are never subjected to the scrutiny of the class action 
process. 
 226. Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 64 (“The defendant is unlikely to challenge the named 
plaintiff’s typicality or adequacy, even when such a challenge might be successful, if the defendant 
believes that counsel representing this particular individual is someone who is likely to cut a 
favorable deal in settlement.”). 
 227. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action 
Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1305 (2006) (“The named plaintiff remains 
an essential prerequisite in all class cases.”).  
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few people think these plaintiffs matter very much, as reflected in the well-
accepted belief that shareholder plaintiffs are “figurehead[s],”228 
“pawns,”229 and a “necessary nuisance.”230 In other words, shareholder 
plaintiffs hold the keys to the courthouse doors, but often do little once 
these doors have been opened. Given this nominal role, why should we 
care about professional plaintiffs? After all, if plaintiffs do not matter, 
maybe professional plaintiffs do not matter. As we shall see, however, 
plaintiffs do matter. Plaintiffs have the potential to play a crucial role in 
preventing collusive settlements. This Subsection explains how the rise of 
professional plaintiffs may undermine the ability of shareholders to 
monitor their attorneys and protect absent class members.  
a.  The Need for a Monitor at the Settlement Table 
If judges expect so little from plaintiffs, why does the legal system still 
require them? This section argues that the  rule requiring plaintiffs is not an 
anachronism from the legal past. Instead, it reflects modern economic 
theory regarding the incentives in shareholder litigation.  
As discussed in Part I, the contingency fee system creates incentives for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to protect the interests of absent class members.231 
Attorneys work hard on behalf of the class because they ultimately get a 
percentage of any settlement or judgment. If these incentives work, 
figurehead plaintiffs—and by extension, professional plaintiffs—are not 
problematic, because plaintiffs’ attorneys stand ready and willing to fight 
for larger settlements on the entire class’s behalf.  
As discussed in Part I, however, plaintiffs’ attorneys have incentives 
that often cause them to underinvest in certain types of shareholder 
litigation and overinvest in others.232 In securities class actions in the 
1990s, attorneys overinvested in litigation because companies were 
agreeing to settle even arguably frivolous claims in order to avoid high 
discovery costs and the risk of catastrophic jury awards.233 In shareholder 
suits filed under state law, attorneys may similarly overinvest in litigation, 
but for different reasons.  
Commentators have long believed that attorneys are overinvesting in 
state shareholder suits. In the early 1990s, for example, one study 
concluded that “shareholder litigation is a weak, if not ineffective, 
instrument of corporate governance” and “the principal beneficiaries of 
                                                                                                                     
 228. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 191 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 229. Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1987).  
 230. Declaration of Michael Hartlieb, Carrigan v. Solectron Corp., No. 1:07-cv-087219 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 2011).  
 231. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 232. See supra note 66. 
 233. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
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cash payouts in shareholder suits are attorneys.”234 More recent studies 
show that these problems have persisted. In 2011 alone, shareholders 
challenged ninety-six percent of acquisitions involving U.S. public 
companies valued at over $500 million.235 This figure strongly suggests 
that plaintiffs’ attorneys are reflexively filing many shareholder suits.  
The overinvestment in these suits arises in large part because of what 
economists call non-zero sum settlements.236 Most settlements are zero-
sum negotiations—every dollar in the plaintiff’s pocket equals a dollar out 
of the defendant’s pocket. In many shareholder lawsuits, however, the 
parties at the settlement table can reach settlements that benefit the 
plaintiffs’ attorney without the defendant incurring any significant loss.237 
These non-zero sum settlements give plaintiffs’ attorneys an incentive to 
file frivolous suits and defendants an incentive not to fight them.238  
Non-zero sum settlements are common in shareholder litigation, often 
including nonmonetary benefits for the plaintiffs combined with significant 
fees for the attorneys. Many acquisition class actions routinely end with 
disclosure-based settlements in which the corporation agrees to make 
additional disclosures regarding the acquisition in exchange for settling the 
suit.239 Similarly, shareholder derivative suits frequently end with the 
corporation agreeing to make arguably cosmetic changes to its corporate 
governance practices in exchange for dismissal of the suit.240 The 
attorneys’ fees in these types of cases are often significant, with one study 
finding that the plaintiffs’ attorneys in acquisition class actions make 
nearly $500 per hour in suits involving nonmonetary settlements.241  
Attorneys can often achieve a similar result in settlements that do 
include a monetary component. Many acquisition class actions are filed 
soon after the initial announcement of the deal. These complaints typically 
allege that the offer is too low. Following this initial offer, however, the 
prospective purchaser and the target’s board often continue negotiations, 
                                                                                                                     
 234. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 55, 65, 84 (1991). 
 235. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 2. This percentage is up from 53% just a few years earlier. 
Id. Nor are these suits limited to the very largest deals. Ninety-one percent of the deals valued at 
over $100 million were challenged in 2011. Id. at 3. 
 236. See Coffee, supra note 20, at 23.  
 237. Settlements can benefit the plaintiffs even if the defendant does not incur a significant 
loss. The concern here is that plaintiffs’ attorneys and defendants are too quick to agree to 
settlements that do not benefit shareholders in large part because the settlements are so cheap for 
defendants.  
 238. Of course, not all suits filed by professional plaintiffs end with such settlements. My point 
relates more broadly to the incentives in these lawsuits.  
 239. See Weiss & White, supra note 16, at 1830 (describing empirical data about settlements 
in acquisition class actions).  
 240. See Erickson, supra note 21, at 1823–24. 
 241. See Weiss & White, supra note 16, at 1830. 
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which can lead to a higher final price. It is relatively easy for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to file suit immediately after the initial announcement of the 
offer, wait for the parties to negotiate a higher price or amended deal terms, 
and then take credit for the changes.242 The Delaware Court of Chancery 
has criticized these settlements, stating that they can be little more than a 
“Kabuki dance.”243 Despite this criticism, however, these settlements 
remain a cheap form of currency in shareholder suits.244 
These settlements are not surprising given the incentives in these suits. 
Non-zero sum settlements benefit defendants who can buy a release at a 
nominal cost. They also benefit plaintiffs’ attorneys who get significant 
fees for relatively little effort. The only people who do not benefit from 
these settlements are shareholders—the real parties in interest in these 
suits. These settlements occur because no one at the settlement table is 
protecting shareholder interests. In other words, the legal system is missing 
a crucial monitor at the settlement table. 
These settlements do not just hurt the shareholders of the particular 
company targeted in the lawsuit. They also undermine the role of private 
litigation in deterring corporate fraud. Corporate wrongdoers have little to 
fear from litigation if they know that they can escape significant monetary 
liability by agreeing to a nonmonetary settlement and high attorneys’ fees. 
In short, the fact that we are missing a monitor at the settlement table not 
only leads to problematic settlements—it also undermines the deterrent 
role of shareholder litigation. 
b.  The Role of Shareholders Versus Other Monitors 
If the current incentives in shareholder litigation lead to problematic 
settlements, the question becomes how to stop these settlements. As we 
will see, shareholders play a critical role in stopping problematic 
settlements, but this role is undermined by the continued presence of 
professional plaintiffs. To understand this role, however, we must first 
examine alternative proposals to address the incentive problems in 
                                                                                                                     
 242. The Delaware Court of Chancery has analyzed these settlement dynamics in a number of 
decisions. See, e.g., In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 621 (Del. 2005).  
 243. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945 (Del. 2010). A Kabuki dance is an 
event “that looks to have an uncertain outcome but actually comes to a conclusion the participants 
have scripted in advance.” See State v. Bowser, 266 P.3d 1253, at *4 (2012).  
 244. Concerns about professional plaintiffs are bolstered by the research of Professor Michael 
Perino, who examined whether the cases named in the Milberg Weiss indictments ended differently 
than other comparable cases. See Michael A. Perino, The Milberg Weiss Prosecution: No Harm. No 
Foul?, 11 Briefly iii (May 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=1133995. He 
found a statistically significant difference in the attorneys’ fees between the cases named in the 
indictment and other comparable cases. Id. at 39–58. This difference was modest, and Professor 
Perino found no difference in the overall size of the settlements, so his findings should not be 
overstated. But his research does suggest that investors suffer in cases where the named plaintiff has 
a financial interest adverse to the interests of the class.  
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shareholder litigation. Scholars have put forth at least two types of 
proposals to address these problems: (1) those that rely on the watchful eye 
of judges, and (2) those that rely on altered economic incentives for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys. 
Many commentators have pinned their hopes on more effective 
oversight by judges.245 If judges routinely rejected cosmetic settlements 
and exercised more careful oversight of plaintiffs’ attorneys, they could 
prevent collusion in shareholder suits. In a series of recent opinions, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery has endorsed this approach.246 The court has 
made clear that it will closely examine settlement terms, rejecting those 
that benefit attorneys at the expense of shareholders.247 In my discussions 
with members of the Delaware bar, several observed that these efforts have 
started to change the state of play in Delaware. For example, parties may 
be more reluctant to agree to nonmonetary settlements. They may also 
conduct more confirmatory discovery before presenting settlements to the 
court. In sum, Delaware courts are looking harder at these cases, and this 
scrutiny may be changing how lawyers litigate.  
Will the changes in Delaware change shareholder litigation more 
generally? There is some reason to doubt that they will. Even if Delaware 
is eager to perform this gatekeeping function, other courts may not be. 
Over the last several years, plaintiffs’ attorneys have increasingly started to 
file lawsuits outside Delaware.248 Indeed, of the cases filed by repeat 
plaintiffs in my study, less than one-quarter were filed in Delaware.249 The 
rest were filed in other state and federal courts across the country. Even if 
we trust Delaware judges to root out professional plaintiffs, we may not 
have the same confidence in judges in other jurisdictions. This observation 
is not meant as a criticism of these judges. Delaware judges are uniquely 
situated to take an active role in shareholder litigation because they see 
these cases day in and day out. Judges in other jurisdictions may simply not 
                                                                                                                     
 245. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Sharpening the Sword: Class Certification, Appellate Review, 
and The Role of the Fiduciary Judge in Class Action Lawsuits, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1042, 1043 
(2004); Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 
65, 136–38 (2003); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action 
Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 193 (2009) (establishing a sliding scale for judicial oversight 
of class action settlements). 
 246. See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d at 956; In re Del Monte Foods Co. 
S’holders Litig., 2010 WL 5550677, at *9–11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2010). 
 247. For example, the court has noted that law firms can “build (and sometimes burn) 
reputational capital with the Court” and stated that it will replace plaintiffs’ attorneys who fail to 
protect the interests of absent class members. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d at 955–
56. 
 248. See Bernard Black et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, at 1, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578404. 
 249. Specifically, 23.2% were filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The cases that were 
filed in federal court typically relied on diversity jurisdiction, although the complaints occasionally 
included federal question claims as well.  
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know to be on the lookout for professional plaintiffs, problematic 
settlements, or any of the other potential problems in these cases. 
Delaware is trying to solve the problem of multi-forum litigation, an 
effort that may have implications for professional plaintiffs. In a 2010 
decision, Delaware Court of Chancery Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster 
invited corporations to adopt provisions specifying the Delaware courts as 
the “exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”250 More than eighty 
companies have taken up this invitation, adopting exclusive forum 
provisions in either their charters or bylaws.251 The legal validity of these 
provisions is uncertain—they are currently under challenge in the courts,252 
and at least one judge has refused to apply them.253 
The research on professional plaintiffs provides an additional reason to 
enforce these provisions. As discussed above, Delaware is uniquely 
situated to address the problem of professional plaintiffs. Moreover, judges 
would be better able to recognize professional plaintiffs if shareholder 
lawsuits were all filed in a single court. Yet, these provisions are not a 
cure-all. Even if they survive legal challenge, they may not bring all 
professional plaintiffs to the attention of the court. Moreover, even 
Delaware does not have a perfect record when it comes to identifying these 
plaintiffs.254  
Many scholars have instead advocated reforms that change the 
incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys. As just one example, some scholars 
have argued that courts should use an auction system in which plaintiffs’ 
attorneys bid for the right to control the litigation.255 Any proceeds from 
the auction would be distributed to the class.256 The winning bidder would 
then keep the entire recovery in the litigation.257 This proposal garnered 
                                                                                                                     
 250. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d at 960.  
 251. See Claudia H. Allen, Study of Delaware Forum Selection in Charters and Bylaws, at 
ii, http://www.ngelaw.com/files/Publication/4050bc71-8f96-4442-9ed1-8ce7fc59716d/Presentation/ 
PublicationAttachment/411832b1-153c-4d49-9dd4-b4e16548082f/Exclusive_Forum_Provisions_S 
tudy_4_7_11.pdf. 
 252. See, e.g., Verified Complaint, iClub Inv. P’ship v. FedEx Corp., No. 7238, 2012 WL 
467504, at ¶ 1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2012); Verified Complaint, Neighbors v. Air Prods. & Chems., 
Inc., No. 7240, 2012 WL 467520, at ¶ 1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2012); Verified Complaint, 
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. 7219, 2012 WL 381849, at ¶ 1 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2012). 
 253. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174–75 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  
 254. The lawsuits filed by the entities associated with Dean Drulias discussed in Section II.C 
illustrate this point. These entities filed multiple lawsuits in the Delaware Court of Chancery before 
anyone noticed the potential problems. Moreover, the court would likely not have learned about the 
connection between these partnerships if Mr. Drulias had not mistakenly identified the wrong 
partnership in his original complaint. In short, even the Delaware Court of Chancery did not notice 
these potential problems until they became almost too obvious to miss. 
 255. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 6.  
 256. Id. at 106–08. 
 257. See id.  
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significant attention initially, and a few courts experimented with it,258 but 
ultimately lawmakers have been unable to structure an auction model that 
solves the problems inherent in shareholder litigation.259 As Professor 
Coffee has noted, the limitations of such proposals “suggest that the legal 
system cannot pin all its hopes on the attorneys’ fee award as the optimal 
incentive device.”260  
The intractability of these problems suggests that we should not be so 
quick to write off the plaintiffs in shareholder lawsuits. If judges cannot 
protect plaintiffs and attorneys cannot protect plaintiffs, maybe plaintiffs 
can protect plaintiffs.  
The law is increasingly moving in this direction. The PSLRA, for 
example, is based on the idea that plaintiffs matter. By granting control of 
the litigation to the shareholder with the greatest financial stake, Congress 
made clear that shareholder plaintiffs have a crucial role to play in 
securities class actions.261 The Delaware Court of Chancery has moved in a 
similar direction, giving preference to larger shareholders when 
determining the leadership structure in shareholder lawsuits.262 In other 
words, as much as we say that plaintiffs do not matter, lawmakers continue 
to think they do. Given the problems with other monitors in securities class 
actions, lawmakers have good reason to think that plaintiffs matter. 
This analysis does not mean that plaintiffs are a panacea. Large, 
institutional shareholders can be co-opted in many of the same ways as 
attorneys. Any hope that institutions would be unbiased monitors has been 
dashed by allegations that large pension funds may be trading their 
participation in litigation for campaign contributions.263 These problems do 
not mean that plaintiffs are irrelevant—instead, they simply mean that 
                                                                                                                     
 258. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 220 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
auction procedure used by the district court violated the PSLRA).  
 259. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class 
Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 727–28 (2002); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. 
Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 NW. L. REV. 
423, 434–36 (1993). Stephen Choi and Robert Thompson similarly found that the PSLRA’s 
mandate that courts conduct a Rule 11 inquiry at the end of every securities class action has had 
minimal impact. See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: 
Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1507–11 (2006).  
 260. John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 288, 308 (2010). 
 261. This aim is clear from the legislative history. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34 
(1995) (Conf. Rep.) (“The Conference Committee believes that increasing the role of institutional 
investors in class actions will ultimately benefit shareholders and assist courts by improving the 
quality of representation in securities class actions.”). 
 262. See Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co. LLC, No. 19575, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. 
Ch. June 18, 2002).  
 263. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., The Price of Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, U. 
Mich. Law & Econ., Empirical Legal Stud. Ctr. Paper No. 09-025, at 2 (2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1527047. 
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plaintiffs are one piece of a larger puzzle. Judges, attorneys, and 
shareholders are all imperfect monitors, and therefore none of them alone 
is sufficient. The best hope for curbing the agency costs inherent in 
shareholder litigation is legal rules that give all of these actors greater 
incentives to act in the best interests of absent class members.  
How do professional plaintiffs fit into this analysis? If the ideal lead 
plaintiff is an institutional shareholder with strong financial incentives to 
monitor the litigation, some professional plaintiffs are about as far from 
this ideal as we can get. Many professional plaintiffs own a relatively small 
number of shares in the target corporation, which means that they have 
little financial interest to monitor the litigation. Moreover, some have other 
interests that cause them to turn a blind eye when their attorneys make 
decisions that are contrary to the interests of the class. These interests may 
include familial relationships, the promise of future business, or even 
illegal kickbacks. In short, money or other interests may separate 
professional plaintiffs from the rest of the class. 
The research on professional plaintiffs also demonstrates that these 
problems may go deeper than we previously imagined. Conventional 
wisdom holds that institutional plaintiffs increasingly control shareholder 
litigation. This wisdom may quell concerns about the problems in 
shareholder litigation because these institutions, for all their faults, are 
better guardians of shareholder interests than the plaintiffs of the past. As a 
result, it may be easy for commentators to dismiss the problems in 
shareholder litigation if they believe that these problems will be solved as 
institutions extend their reach. The research on professional plaintiffs 
shows that this belief is misplaced. Institutions play a role in shareholder 
litigation, to be sure, but so do professional plaintiffs. Indeed, the sheer 
number of cases filed by repeat and other individual plaintiffs suggests that 
institutional plaintiffs are not on their way to dominating all of these cases.  
The evidence instead suggests that shareholder litigation is moving 
toward a bifurcated litigation model. Under this new model, institutions 
control larger, more high-profile lawsuits, while professional plaintiffs and 
other individual shareholders control many smaller lawsuits with little 
money at stake. This model explains the persistence of professional 
plaintiffs. These plaintiffs do not file the cases that institutional plaintiffs 
want to control. In many instances, professional plaintiffs file the lawsuits 
that institutional plaintiffs want to avoid.264 As a result, the rise of 
institutional plaintiffs may not mean much for the large number of 
shareholder lawsuits dominated by professional plaintiffs.265 These smaller 
                                                                                                                     
 264. Not all cases fall into this bifurcated model. In many cases in my data set, the repeat 
plaintiff filed a complaint along with other plaintiffs, including institutional plaintiffs. In many of 
these cases, the institutional plaintiff was either appointed lead plaintiff or appeared to control the 
suit.  
 265. The bifurcated litigation model also has implications for exit-based reforms proposed by 
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suits may not grace the front pages of the Wall Street Journal, but they still 
have important consequences for investors who see their returns 
diminished by what can amount to a litigation tax on mergers or other 
corporate decisions.  
In the end, despite all of the rhetoric to the contrary, plaintiffs matter. 
Scholars have long preached the dangers of a pure entrepreneurial model, 
yet the legal system has done little to address the problem of professional 
plaintiffs. To eliminate professional plaintiffs from shareholder litigation, 
states must consider legal reforms that ensure a more meaningful role for 
shareholder plaintiffs. 
B.  A Disclosure-Based Solution 
States should address the problem of professional plaintiffs by adopting 
a disclosure-based regime that brings attention to these possible conflicts 
of interest. Part II outlined a number of potential conflicts that can affect a 
plaintiff’s ability to protect absent class members. Under the current 
system, however, the court only learns about these conflicts if the 
defendant investigates the shareholder plaintiff or if the court conducts its 
own inquiry into the plaintiff’s qualifications. As discussed above, 
however, defendants often do not have the proper incentives to investigate 
plaintiffs, and few courts fill this gap with their own inquiry.266  
States can alter these incentives by requiring disclosure of potential 
conflicts of interest. A few jurisdictions have experimented with such 
requirements. The Delaware Court of Chancery, for example, requires the 
plaintiffs in class actions and derivative suits to sign a certification that 
they have not “received, been promised or offered and will not accept any 
form of compensation” for participating in the litigation.267 The PSLRA 
requires plaintiffs to file a similar certification. These rules address some, 
but not all, of the concerns outlined in Part II.  
New certification rules should sweep more broadly. States should 
require shareholder plaintiffs in representative litigation to attach a signed 
certification to their complaint that would include at least four types of 
information.  
First, the certification should include a statement that the plaintiff will 
not accept any payment for serving as a representative party other than 
their pro rata share of the recovery, except as ordered or approved by the 
court. This rule would not prohibit plaintiffs from receiving compensation 
                                                                                                                     
some scholars. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability 
Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 298 (2010) (proposing reforms that would make it easier for 
shareholders to opt out of class actions). Given the low dollar values at stake in most of these suits, 
as well as the slim chance of success, large institutional investors do not have an incentive to opt 
out of the class and file their own independent actions. Id. at 327.  
 266. See discussion supra Subsection II.D.3.  
 267. Del. Ch. R. 23(a) and 23.1(b).  
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for reasonable costs and expenses. This rule is similar to those under both 
Delaware law and the PSLRA.  
Second, the certification should identify all shareholder lawsuits filed 
by the named plaintiff over the past several years. This requirement reflects 
the fact that shareholders may not be effective monitors if they are 
participating in a significant number of lawsuits. It also recognizes that 
attorneys will be less likely to push the envelope if they have to justify 
their litigation decisions to a broader group of shareholders.  
The PSLRA includes a similar requirement, but may not go far enough. 
The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to identify all other securities class actions 
“in which the plaintiff has sought to serve as a representative party.”268 
Many shareholders appear to have interpreted this requirement to require 
disclosure only of the suits in which shareholders have sought to serve as 
lead plaintiff. Many shareholders do not disclose suits they have filed 
where they have not sought to serve as the lead plaintiff. In many 
shareholder lawsuits filed under state law, however, the court does not 
appoint a lead plaintiff. Instead these suits are often litigated under a joint 
leadership structure involving numerous shareholders and attorneys. 
Accordingly, certification requirements in these suits should include all 
shareholder suits filed by the named plaintiff, even if the plaintiff did not 
ultimately seek to serve as lead plaintiff in the litigation.  
Moreover, the certification should cover suits filed in all jurisdictions. 
Congress was able to accomplish its objective because all securities class 
actions fell within its jurisdiction. In contrast, shareholder lawsuits brought 
under state law are typically filed in state or federal courts across the 
country. Imagine, for example, if Delaware adopted a rule requiring 
disclosure of prior suits filed in its courts. An enterprising plaintiff could 
easily circumvent this requirement by filing additional suits in California, 
Nevada, or any other jurisdiction. One could imagine plaintiffs playing a 
game of litigation hopscotch as they moved throughout the country filing 
lawsuits. To prevent this possibility, states should require disclosure of any 
corporate or securities lawsuit in which the shareholder has sought to serve 
as a representative plaintiff, not just lawsuits filed in that particular 
jurisdiction. 
Third, the certification should identify all of the plaintiff’s transactions 
in the stock at issue during the relevant time period. This requirement 
mirrors a similar requirement in the PSLRA. Extending this requirement to 
shareholder suits filed under state law has two intended goals. First, this 
certification would help ensure that named plaintiffs actually owned stock 
in the target corporation during the relevant time period, a concern 
discussed in Section II.D. Second, this certification would highlight the 
plaintiff’s stock ownership to the court, allowing the court to exercise 
                                                                                                                     
 268. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(v). 
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special oversight in cases where the plaintiff has little financial interest in 
the litigation.  
Finally, the certification should include disclosure of any business, 
financial, or familial relationships between the plaintiff and plaintiffs’ 
counsel. This requirement is not currently part of any certification regimes, 
but there is a strong argument that it should be. As discussed in Part II, 
some lawyers appear to be using their family members or business partners 
as plaintiffs in shareholder suits. These relationships have the potential to 
undermine the plaintiffs’ ability to effectively monitor their counsel. States 
should address this problem by requiring plaintiffs to disclose material 
relationships with their counsel. If the plaintiff is an institution, the 
plaintiff should also disclose whether plaintiffs’ counsel has a financial 
interest in the institution. 
This rule should cover all attorneys involved in the litigation, even if 
the attorney has not entered an appearance in the case. This rule reflects the 
fact that there may be more attorneys involved in the litigation than are 
listed on the docket. For example, attorneys who refer the plaintiff to lead 
counsel often do not enter a formal appearance. Other attorneys may 
perform work on the case behind the scenes, perhaps as part of a 
committee of attorneys working under the supervision of lead counsel. 
New rules should require disclosure of relationships with any of these 
attorneys, recognizing that the potential for conflict does not depend on 
whether the attorney has entered an appearance in the case.  
This rule should also cover campaign contributions by attorneys. Many 
public pension funds are repeat filers of securities class actions and other 
shareholder lawsuits. There are allegations that these funds may be trading 
their participation in litigation in exchange for campaign contributions.269 
Certification requirements could target this problem by requiring 
institutional plaintiffs to disclose any campaign contributions from any of 
the attorneys involved in the litigation.  
These disclosure rules would have two distinct benefits. First, they 
would give courts the information they need to carry out their 
responsibilities. Professional plaintiffs flourish because many courts do not 
know to look for them. Yet, even if courts seldom conduct their own 
investigations, few would turn a blind eye once potential problems are 
revealed.  
Second, these rules would discourage plaintiffs’ attorneys from relying 
on problematic plaintiffs. If plaintiffs are required to disclose material 
information about themselves, their attorneys would have less incentive to 
push the envelope. For example, attorneys may be unlikely to use their 
spouses or children as plaintiffs if they know that these relationships must 
be disclosed in a certification to the court. Similarly, attorneys may be less 
                                                                                                                     
 269. See supra note 93. 
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likely to use plaintiffs who own only a few shares of stock in the target 
corporation if they have to disclose the plaintiff’s stock ownership in the 
certification. In this way, disclosure rules could not only bring problems to 
the attention of courts—they could also change litigation practices on the 
ground.270 
These certification requirements would not solve all of the problems in 
shareholder litigation. These requirements are intended to uncover 
potential conflicts of interest between the named plaintiff and the rest of 
the class.271 Yet the ideal plaintiff is not just an unbiased shareholder. The 
ideal plaintiff is also knowledgeable about the case and willing to monitor 
class counsel. Many shareholders, even those who are not professional 
plaintiffs, have inadequate incentives to perform these responsibilities. 
Moreover, even the most motivated plaintiffs will still have limited control 
over the litigation, given the economic reality of contingency fee cases. Yet 
certification requirements would uncover the most egregious problems, 
setting the stage for additional reforms in this area down the road.  
Ultimately, the debate over professional plaintiffs reflects a deeper 
debate over the gatekeepers in entrepreneurial litigation. The law expects 
shareholder plaintiffs to serve a gatekeeping function, yet does little to 
ensure that plaintiffs meet this expectation. The legal system must do more 
to encourage plaintiffs to cast a watchful eye over the litigation. 
Shareholder litigation is uniquely suited for these reforms because many 
shareholders have the financial stake necessary to take an active role in 
litigation. Professional plaintiffs undermine this effort, putting lawsuits 
back in the hands of plaintiffs’ attorneys. In the end, professionalism is 
often a good thing—but not when it comes to choosing plaintiffs.  
CONCLUSION 
In shareholder derivative suits and acquisition class actions across the 
country, plaintiffs’ attorneys appear to be using the exact same practices 
that provoked Congress’s ire almost twenty years ago. Some attorneys are 
using the same plaintiffs in dozens of suits. Others are relying on their 
close relatives to serve as plaintiffs. As the first study of its kind, this 
Article shows that professional plaintiffs have been hiding right under our 
noses all along.  
These findings have implications even outside the bounds of corporate 
law. Shareholder litigation is one type of entrepreneurial litigation, and the 
                                                                                                                     
 270. It is obviously possible that plaintiffs or their attorneys could lie in these certifications. 
An attorney who is willing to make ethically suspect payments to plaintiffs may also be willing to 
make false representations to the court. It is more likely, however, that the attorneys push the 
envelope because they know that no one is looking. A system that forces disclosure will reduce this 
temptation. 
 271. Or, in a shareholder derivative suit, conflicts between the named plaintiff and the 
corporation on whose behalf the suit was brought.  
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same incentives that drive shareholder litigation often drive other types of 
entrepreneurial litigation as well. Are the practices uncovered in 
shareholder litigation common in other types of entrepreneurial litigation? 
If so, what are the implications for the legal system more broadly? These 
questions remain for another day, but one thing is clear. Professional 
plaintiffs are back, and the time has come for a new solution to this old 
problem. 
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